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Introduction

The history of California in the twentieth century is
the story of a state inventing itself with water.1

Institutional
Arrangements for
Conjunctive Water
Management in
California and
Analysis of Legal
Reform Alternatives
By Ella Foley-Gannon

The creation of California’s water resources
system has not been an easy task given the
state’s hydrology and demographics. California’s water problem is not so much a lack of
precipitation as it is an uneven, and highly
variable, distribution of its water resources.
More than seventy percent of California’s water
supply originates north of San Francisco, principally in the Sacramento River basin and in
the North Coast. Yet, approximately seventyfive percent of the demand for water is to the
south of this hydrological divide. On average,
seventy-five percent of California’s annual precipitation falls between November and March,
with fifty percent occurring between November
and February. California’s hydrological cycle is
not synchronized, however, with the seasonal
demand for water. Urban and agricultural water
use is relatively low during the period of abundant supply and peaks in the summer and late
fall months when precipitation is usually nonexistent.
Moreover, to compound these disparities,
water supplies vary dramatically from year-toyear. Annual water run-off in the state is
approximately 71 million acre-feet. But this
average includes a record low of 15 million
acre-feet in 1977, which was the second year of
the worst acute drought on record, and the historic high of 135 million acre-feet in 1983, an El
Niño year. During the twentieth century,
California has suffered serious droughts in
1912-13, 1918-20, 1922-24, 1929-34, 1947-50,
1959-61, 1976-77, and 1987-92.2
These variations render water resources
management highly uncertain. To address

 J.D., 1998, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law. Ms. Foley-Gannon is an associate at Sheppard, Mullin,
Richter & Hampton in San Francisco, practicing environmental
and land use law.
1. WILLIAM L. KAHRL, WATER AND POWER: THE CONFLICT
LOS ANGELES’ WATER SUPPLY IN OWENS VALLEY 1 (1982).

OVER

2. All data are taken from CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RESOURCES,
BULL. 160-98, CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE, Vol. 1, at 3-2 to 3-11
(1998) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE].
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these variations and uncertainties, California
water managers have had to create systems to
store water during times of abundance and to
transport the water from areas of surplus to
areas of need. California’s monumental and
complex array of reservoirs and conveyance
facilities stands as testament to the ingenuity
and resourcefulness of these leaders.
As the demand for water continues to
increase, further innovations in water resources
management will be imperative. The California
Department of Water Resources (“DWR”) projects that California’s population will grow to
47.5 million by the year 2020, up from 32.1 million in 1995. Accompanying this growth will be
an increase in the demand for water by municipal and industrial users from approximately
8.8 million acre-feet in 1995 to 12 million acrefeet in the year 2020.3 Based on the capacity of
existing water supply facilities and water management programs, DWR predicts that there
will be an annual water shortage of 2.4 million
acre-feet in normal years and 6.2 million acrefeet during periods of drought.4
The extent of California’s vulnerability
both to cycles of shortage and to long-term
distributional disparities is highlighted by the

most recent drought in California, which lasted from 1987 to 1992. During this period, farmers and municipalities suffered from severe
water shortages and were forced to ration
water and fallow land.5 The drought also contributed to a panoply of environmental problems, including damage to vulnerable fish
populations, significant loss of timber in the
Sierra Nevada, and increased fire hazards.6
Moreover, many water users relied heavily on
groundwater to compensate for deficits in surface water supplies.7 This increase in groundwater pumping caused the overdraft of many
of California’s groundwater basins.8 Prolonged
overdraft can cause a number of long-term,
detrimental economic and environmental
effects.9 When a groundwater basin is in overdraft, groundwater users often must deepen
wells and install more powerful pumps to
extract a sufficient supply of water from ever
greater depths.10 Overdraft also can result in
subsidence of overlying land,11 loss of surface
vegetation and wetlands habitat,12 depletion of
water flow in hydrologically-connected surface
water systems, and degradation of groundwater quality.13 Moreover, extended periods of
overdraft can cause the water-bearing rock or

3. See id. at 4-2. According to DWR’s projections, agricultural water use will decline slightly from 33.8 million acre-feet in
1995 to 31.5 million acre-feet in 2020. See id.

9. See Gregory S. Weber, Twenty Years of Local Groundwater
Export Legislation in California: Lessons from a Patchwork Quilt, 34 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 657, 660 (1994).

4.

See CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE Vol. 2, supra note 2, at

6-2.
5. The economic effects of farmers fallowing land are not
limited to the farmers themselves. When water shortages force
local farming operations to go out of operation, agricultural suppliers and farm workers can experience unemployment, local
businesses may lose revenue and rural communities can suffer
decreased public resources. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV.
673, 733-35 (1993); Charles V. Moore, Discussion, in WATER SCARCITY:
IMPACTS ON WESTERN AGRICULTURE 266, 268-69 (Ernest A. Engelbert
& Ann Foley Scheuring eds., 1984); Deborah Moore & Zach Willey,
Water in the American West: Institutional Evolution and Environmental
Restoration in the 21st Century, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 775, 793-94 (1991).
6. See Brian E. Gray, The Market and The Community Lessons
from California’s Drought Water Bank, 1 HASTINGS WEST-NORTHWEST J. OF
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 17, 18-20 (1994).
7. For example, in 1990 there were 24,000 new wells drilled
in California, the highest number of wells drilled in a single year.
See id. at 19.
8. For example, groundwater depletion in the eastern San
Joaquin Valley and the Tulare Basin exceeded eleven million acrefeet during the most recent drought. See Gray, supra note 6, at 19
(citing CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RESOURCES, THE 1991 DROUGHT WATER
BANK 16 (1992)).
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10.

See id.

11. “When water is withdrawn from a groundwater basin,
the underground pressure is sometimes reduced enough to
cause compaction of the water-bearing strata. When that happens, the overlying land subsides, losing elevation. Land subsidence can submerge once-dry land, adversely affect drainage patterns by changing the slope of the land, and damage surface
structures such as highways, buildings, pipelines, and water distribution systems.” Susan Batty Peterson, The Designation and
Protection of Critical Groundwater Areas, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1393, 1395
(1991).
12. The loss of wetlands can have a devastating effect on
wildlife populations. Wetlands provide critical habitat for approximately one-third of the nation’s endangered and threatened
species. Since 1850, ninety-six percent of California’s Central
Valley wetlands has been lost. See, e.g., Moore & Willey, supra note
5, at 776-78.
13. See Zachary Smith, Rewriting California Groundwater Law:
Past Attempts and Prerequisites to Reform, 20 CAL. W. L. REV. 223, 225
(1984); Allison Mylander Gregory, Groundwater and Its Future:
Competing Interests and Burgeoning Markets, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 229,
232-33 (1992).
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14.

See Peterson, supra note 11, at 1395.

15.

See Brian E. Gray, The Modern Era in California Water Law,
45 HASTINGS L. J. 249, 278 (1994).
16. Despite the advantages of conjunctive water management, there remain a variety of legal uncertainties and institutional impediments to the creation of large-scale conjunctive use
programs, particularly in unadjudicated basins. California has a
dual system of water rights. There is one set of rules to apportion
surface water and separate rules for groundwater. See Generally
ARTHUR L. LITTLEWORTH & ERIC L. GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER 27-70
(1995). While the legislature has extensively regulated surface
water diversions, it has exerted only minimal control over
groundwater extractions. The State Water Resources Control

Under a conjunctive use program, surface
water and groundwater supplies commingle,
and the legally distinct water rights of various
users are melded together. Many different private parties and public agencies may claim a
right to use, or to regulate the use of, the water
found within the groundwater basin.
Conjunctive use arrangements have worked
well in adjudicated groundwater basins in
Southern California because the various rights
to surface and groundwater are quantified and
the management agencies have the legal
authority to enforce the pricing and other rules
that govern groundwater and surface water
use.19 Most groundwater basins in California
are unadjudicated, however, and the feasibility
of conjunctive management in these areas is
consequently far less certain. This is particularly true in basins in which a portion of the surface water is imported, stored as groundwater,
and then later withdrawn for uses outside the
groundwater basin. In these situations, there
exist an array of legal and institutional uncertainties that render conjunctive management
difficult, if not impossible. These uncertainties
include questions about the ownership of the
imported water, liability for displacement of inbasin recharge capacity, regulation of groundwater users who are not parties to the conjunctive management agreement, the authority of
local water agencies over the importation and
exportation of surface water, and liability for
changes in water quality.
This article analyzes the legal and institutional opportunities and constraints on conjunctive management of groundwater and surface water in California. Part II presents a theoretical model for a statewide conjunctive use
program. Part III analyzes the current legal and
Board (“SWRCB”) regulates the appropriation and use of much of
the state’s surface water. In contrast, groundwater basins are
managed, if at all, by local institutions.
17. See, e.g., Linton A. Brown, Conjunctive Use: Problems and
Advantages, in BIENNIAL CONFERENCE ON GROUND WATER 25 (1994);
James A. Anderson, Some Thoughts on Conjunctive Use of Groundwater
in California, 16 W. ST. L. REV. 559 (1989) (on file with author).
18.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1011.5 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).

19. These conjunctive management programs have been
studied and well-documented in WILLIAM A. BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING
THE WATERS: GOVERNING GROUNDWATER IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
(1992).
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soil in a basin to compact permanently and,
thereby, reduce the amount of storage space
available in the basin for use in the future.14
Unless new ways are discovered to satisfy the
state’s burgeoning water demand, California
can expect to encounter similar problems during future droughts.
In the past, when demand for water outpaced supply, California responded by developing new surface water resources. Today,
however, political, fiscal and environmental
considerations render the construction of
additional surface water facilities less likely.15
Therefore, to meet the challenge of ensuring
that California’s limited water supply can be
stretched to meet the demands of the twentyfirst century, the state needs to develop management procedures to provide for optimal utilization of its developed water resources.
One of the least expensive and environmentally safest ways of stretching available
water supplies is through the development of
conjunctive use programs.16 Under such programs, surplus surface water is banked in
underground aquifers during wet periods and
is extracted for use in times of scarcity.
Groundwater basins are used both to augment
the storage capacity of surface reservoirs and
to allow for the capture of a larger percentage
of annual runoff for beneficial use.17 In 1992,
the California legislature recognized that conjunctive use programs could play a vital role in
California’s efforts to use water more efficiently by adding section 1011.5 to the California
Water Code. This law declares that “it is the
policy of this state to encourage conjunctive
use of surface water and groundwater supplies
and to make surface water available for other
beneficial uses.”18

Conjunctive Water Management in California
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institutional framework for regulating the
State’s groundwater resources. The legal uncertainties created by the present legal system are
described in Part IV. Part V explains how a conjunctive management scheme can be created
under the current legal and institutional
regime. Part VI concludes with an evaluation of
various legal reforms that could be implemented to encourage and facilitate conjunctive
water management in California.
II. A Model Conjunctive Use Program
A. Conceptual Framework
Conjunctive use programs are designed to
coordinate the management of surface water
supplies and storage with the management of
groundwater. The concept of conjunctive management is not new. Individual water users
with access to both types of supplies have long
coordinated their own use. They have relied on
surface water when there is ample supply and
increased their use of groundwater in times of
scarcity.20 Many water agencies also have
engaged in small scale, intra-regional transfers
of groundwater both to help meet their members’ and customers’ needs in times of shortage and to protect groundwater quality.21
Moreover, a number of agencies and water
users with access to groundwater participated
in the 1991 California Drought Water Bank.
Approximately 260,000 acre-feet of surface
water was purchased from Northern California
water users and sold to users throughout the
20.

See Thompson, supra note 5, at 685 n.36.

21. Most of these arrangements have been limited to the
storage of water in basins for the use of overlying landowners. See
CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE VOL. 1, supra note 2, at 3-51 to 3-53
(discussing examples of conjunctive use activity in California).
For a review of the legal authority for public agencies in California
to store imported water in groundwater basins and later extract
the water so stored, see City of Los Angeles v. City of San
Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199 (1975) (public agencies have the right to
the return flow from water imported into a groundwater basin);
City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal. 2d 68 (1943)
(upholding the right of Los Angeles to use the San Fernando
Valley for imported groundwater banking); Niles Sand & Gravel,
Co. v. Alameda County Water Dist., 37 Cal. App. 3d 924 (1974) cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1975) (Alameda County Water District has
authority to store water in a groundwater basin pursuant to its
police powers, and prevention of salt water intrusion is a beneficial use).

276

Volume 6, Numbers 2 & 3

state. The sellers then substituted groundwater
for the surface water that they transferred.
These transfers effectively increased the total
quantity of water available to all users by
increasing the use of groundwater in the areas
with access to both types of supplies, while
moving surface water to areas in which additional groundwater was not available.22
Although conjunctive management is not
new, the potential of California’s groundwater
basins to serve as subterranean reservoirs has
not been approached. There are 450 identified
groundwater basins in California that contain
about 850 million acre-feet of water.23 On average, approximately 12.5 million acre-feet of
groundwater is pumped each year, with extractions rising to 15.8 million acre-feet during
periods of drought.24 Hydrologists estimate
that, in light of current levels of extraction and
recharge, 143 million acre-feet of storage
capacity within these groundwater basins is
close enough to the surface, and has sufficient
permeability, to be used as temporary storage
space.25 This potential storage capacity vastly
exceeds the total capacity of California’s surface reservoirs, which are capable of storing
approximately 42 million acre-feet of water.26 If
this space were fully utilized, California could
significantly increase the yield of its available
water resources.
Conjunctive use programs involve the
movement of water captured in surface water
facilities through conveyance facilities to areas
overlying groundwater basins with accessible
22. DWR classified all of the groundwater that was
pumped as a substitute for the transferred surface water as “new”
water. This classification was based on a finding that groundwater was not taken from a hydrologically connected surface water
system and was, therefore, new water in the sense that the water
would not have been available for appropriation as part of the
surface water system. See Gray, supra note 6, at 22.
23.

See LITTLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 16, at 2.

24.

See CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE VOL. 1, supra note 2, at

3-48.
25. See Ronald B. Robie & Patricia R. Donovan, Water
Management of the Future: A Groundwater Storage Program for the
California State Water Project, 11 PAC. L. J. 41, 43 (1979). An aquifer
has vacant space if there are openings between soil particles or
soil strata which could hold additional water. See Gregory, supra
note 13, at 258 n.116.
26. See CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE VOL. 1, supra note 2, at
3-23 to 3-45; see also Russell Kletzing, Imported Groundwater Banking:
The Kern Water Bank: A Case Study, 19 PAC. L. J. 1225 (1988).

WEST

available storage. The water then is placed in
the basin by one of two methods; direct
recharge or “in lieu” storage. With direct
recharge, water is directly recharged into a
basin through the use of either spreading
fields27 or injection wells.28 The “in lieu” method
is accomplished by delivering surface water to
groundwater users who agree to forgo pumping during the delivery period.29 Through either
method, the importer of the water retains title
to the water it places (or allows to remain) in
the groundwater basin and has the right to
extract the water when surface supplies are
scarce.
Under such programs, the state’s groundwater basins serve the same function as surface reservoirs. The vacant storage capacities
of groundwater basins allow for the capture
and exploitation of water that is not currently
applied to beneficial use. Conjunctive use programs, therefore, result in a net gain to
California’s water supply without the development of additional surface water storage facilities. This new water may be used to satisfy currently unmet needs wherever they occur
throughout the state, and helps to ensure a
stable water supply for the future. Additionally,
such programs increase the flood control
capacity of the state’s reservoirs. By placing
water that is currently stored in surface reservoirs in groundwater basins, space may be left
in surface reservoirs to absorb a sudden influx
of water without the need to release water from
dams.

There are a variety of other advantages to
storing water in groundwater basins rather
than in surface reservoirs. First, underground
storage decreases the demand for construction
of expensive surface storage facilities.30
Second, groundwater basins serve as natural
distribution systems and thereby obviate some
of the need to construct additional conveyance
facilities.31 Third, water stored underground is
not lost to evaporation.32 Fourth, “groundwater
basins provide natural treatment and purification”33 and, therefore, can both improve water
quality and reduce the costs of treatment.
Fifth, groundwater serves as an emergency
supply in the event of disruptions to surface
water systems.34 Sixth, while water is stored
within the basin, the groundwater level within
the basin will be raised and the energy cost of
extracting water from the basin will be
reduced. Finally, “storage of surface water in
natural underground basins avoids nearly all
the surface land use dislocations and stream
effects that would otherwise result, since the
building of surface reservoirs often requires
extensive land excavation as well as the rerouting of local streams.”35

27. When a groundwater basin is recharged by the maintenance of a spreading field, water is spread over porous surface
areas. “The water’s weight and density force it to percolate
through the underlying soil and into the underground basin.”
Victor E. Gleason, Water Projects Go Underground, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q.
625, 627 (1976). The use of spreading fields is generally the preferred means for directly recharging water into an aquifer because
it is the least costly method.

water can be extracted from a location that is geographically distant from, but hydrologically connected to, the place of active
recharge. See Gleason, supra note 27, at 626-27; Peterson, supra
note 11, at 1396-97; Christopher B. Amandes, Controlling Land
Surface Subsidence: A Proposal for a Market Based Regulatory Scheme, 31
UCLA L. REV. 1208, 1246 (1984). The cost of transporting water
between hydrologically separate waterways can be quite significant. For example, it is estimated that it will cost $50 million to
move water eighty to ninety miles from the Colorado River to the
Central Arizona Project. See Thompson, supra note 5, at 709 n.143.

28. Under this method, water is injected into the ground
by the use of force other than gravity. See id.
29.

See Robie & Donovan, supra note 25, at 45.

30. For a comparison of the water development costs of
surface water and groundwater facilities, see CAL. DEP’T OF WATER
RESOURCES, BULL. 76, DELTA WATER FACILITIES (1998).
31. Because water moves freely throughout a groundwater
basin, a user can withdraw water from any point overlying the
basin. As is discussed below, groundwater basins can consist of
hundreds of miles of hydrologically connected aquifers. Thus,

B. Prerequisites for the Creation of
Conjunctive Use Programs
For groundwater basins to be employed as
subterranean reservoirs, there must be an
established method for regulating activities
that affect the basin to ensure that the water
stored in the aquifer will be protected from

32.

See Robie & Donovan, supra note 25, at 45.

33. D. JAQUETT & N. MOORE, EFFICIENT WATER USE
CALIFORNIA: GROUNDWATER USE AND MANAGEMENT 3-4 (1978).

IN

34. “Where imported water has been brought in by aqueduct, the stored water in the underground reservoir provides a
reserve against failure of the aqueduct.” Kletzing, supra note 26, at
1245.
35.

Robie & Donovan, supra note 25, at 44-45.
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degradation or loss so it later can be extracted
for beneficial uses. A vital first step in the
development of an effective groundwater management strategy is a thorough understanding
of the hydrological and geologic conditions of
the basin. Because a conjunctive use program
involves the commingling of native groundwater and imported water, there also must be a
system for establishing and protecting the
rights of those who depend on both types of
sources. In addition, conjunctive management
usually involves the recharge and discharge of
large quantities of water within a basin, which
may result in dramatic changes in the water
table over relatively short periods of time.
Fluctuations of water levels in a groundwater
basin can affect the land overlying the basin,
the purity of the water contained within the
basin, the ability of users to withdraw water
from established wells and the structure of the
basin itself. These potentially deleterious
third-party effects must be identified and
assessed before the benefits of such a program
can be evaluated. Finally, conjunctive management requires water users to enter into voluntary agreements to establish the methods, procedures and responsibilities for the delivery,
storage and recapture of water within a particular basin. Conjunctive use programs will only
come to fruition if the parties with rights to
surface water and those who control the management of groundwater basins and conveyance facilities view participation in such
programs as mutually advantageous. Thus,
there must exist incentives for parties to broker
such agreements before a conjunctive use program can become operational.

36. For example, it is often difficult to determine the precise boundaries of a groundwater basin. The identity of parties
whose activities can affect the quantity and quality of water within a basin can only be determined when the physical limits of a
basin have been defined.
37. Michele Engel, Comment, Water Quality Control: The
Reality of Priority in Utah Groundwater Management, 1992 UTAH L. REV.
491, 496 (1992).
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1. Groundwater Hydrology
In theory, a groundwater basin can serve the
same function as a surface reservoir: it can act as
a natural receptacle for storing water for subsequent extraction and application to beneficial
use. The physical realities of a groundwater
basin differ, however, from a surface reservoir,
and these differences render many of the management techniques developed for the control
of surface reservoirs inapplicable to groundwater basins.36 “In many ways, groundwater is more
difficult to manage than air or surface water
because it is not directly accessible and exists
under a wide variety of hydrological conditions.”37 Because the physical characteristics of
groundwater basins vary greatly, the suitability
of a particular basin to serve as an area for
immediate storage and later extraction depends
on its hydrological and geological features, as
well as on the quality of the water stored within
the basin.
The California Water Code defines groundwater as “all water beneath the surface of the
earth within the zone below the water table in
which the soil is completely saturated with
water, but does not include water which flows in
known and definite channels.”38 Water within the
zone of saturation accumulates in the interstices
of underground rocks and sediments and moves
with relative ease through the permeable strata
in which it is contained to supply wells and
springs.39 The subsurface geological formations
in which the water occurs are called aquifers.40
As one author stated “[a] typical aquifer . . . in
some ways is similar to a bucket of sand halffilled with water. Drilling a well is like digging a
hole in this sand and allowing it to fill with water
which can then be removed.”41 A groundwater
basin consists of “a geologically and hydrologically defined area which contains one or more
aquifers which store and transmit water and will
yield significant quantities of water to wells.”42
38.

CAL. WATER CODE § 10752(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).

39.

See Peterson, supra note 11, at 1394.

40. See Weber, supra note 9, at 669-72 (1994) (“hydrologists
uniformly define an aquifer simply as a rock unit that will yield
water in usable quantity to a well or spring”) (citing R. HEATH,
BASIC GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY 4 (1982)).
41. Gary Widman, Groundwater-Hydrology and the Problem of
Competing Well Owners, 14 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 523, 525 (1968).

WEST

b. Determining a Groundwater
Basin’s Capacity to Retain
Water
The storage capacity of a groundwater
basin is a function of the geological material of
which it is comprised. An aquifer has vacant
space when the openings between the soil particles, or soil strata, can hold more water.46 The
amount of water contained within a basin is
dependent on the historic amounts of precipitation, recharge and total outflows. For a
groundwater basin to be an appropriate site for
a conjunctive use project, it must have the
capacity to accept and retain a minimum
amount of imported surface water. Thus, one
prerequisite to designation of a basin for conjunctive use is the determination that there is
42. GOVERNOR’S COMM. TO REVIEW CAL. WATER RIGHTS LAW,
FINAL REPORT 174 (1978). Unlike the term “aquifer,” however, the
definition of “groundwater basin” lacks precision and many
hydrologists speak only in terms of aquifers. See Weber, supra note
9, at 670. While there is considerable overlap between the two
terms, a basin is the preferred water management term because
it focuses on the area of land overlying the subterranean structure and it recognizes that multiple layers of hydrologically connected aquifers may underlie a single area. See id. at 670-71.
43. See Debbie Sivas, Groundwater Pollution from Agricultural
Activities: Policies for Protection, 7 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 117, 118-19
(1987/1988).

sufficient unused storage space to render the
administration of the project economical.
Many aquifers are hydrologically connected to surface water systems and to other
aquifers; that is, they share a permeable layer
through which water can flow. The movement
of water between hydrologically connected systems will depend on the relative water levels in
each system. For example, when the water
table of a groundwater basin intersects with a
stream bed, the groundwater will provide a
base flow for the stream.47 In this circumstance,
water added to the basin will not increase the
amount of water contained within the basin,
but will increase the flow of the connected
stream. Similarly, extractions from a groundwater basin can result in the lowering of the
water table and cause water from a connected
surface water system to percolate into the
basin. To ensure that water intentionally
placed within an aquifer is retained, and that
the operation of a conjunctive use project will
not interfere with the flow of surface water systems, the project basin should be sufficiently
isolated from adjacent surface and groundwater systems.
c. Geological Features that Affect
the Extraction of Water
As previously noted, water within a
groundwater basin will flow with relative ease
throughout the permeable layer in which it is
contained. The mobility of water within the
aquifer will depend on the hydraulic conductivity of the basin material.48 Where a basin is
comprised of porous granular deposits such as
sand and gravel, water will travel throughout
the basin at a greater rate than if the basin is
comprised of fine grained material of low permeability such as silts, clays and tills which
44. See V. PYE ET AL., GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 2 (1983). Some aquifers are completely surrounded
by an impenetrable layer and, therefore, are not capable of
receiving natural or intentional recharge. See id.
45. See id. Some aquifers are surrounded by aquitards
which are confining beds that retard but do not prevent the flow
of water into and out of the aquifer.
46.

See Gregory, supra note 13, at 258, n.116.

47.

Peterson, supra note 11, at 1397-98.

48. See Kevin L. Patrick & Kelly E. Archer, A Comparison of
State Groundwater Laws, 30 TULSA L.J. 123, 126 (1994).
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a. Geological Features that
Influence Recharge
The manner in which water reaches the
subterranean permeable strata depends on the
geological characteristics of the aquifer into
which it flows. An aquifer is classified as either
confined or unconfined. In a confined aquifer, a
permeable strata of rock, sand or gravel is surrounded by a layer of relatively impermeable
rock or clay, which acts as a barrier to the transmission of water from outside the aquifer.43
Confined aquifers can only be recharged at
points where the permeable strata comes into
contact with the surface or porous soil44 or by
penetrating the impermeable layer and forcing
water into the basin. By contrast, an unconfined aquifer has no such barrier and water can
flow across most of its surface area.45 Thus, an
aquifer can be recharged through the use of
spreading fields or natural percolation only if it
has a sufficiently permeable layer through
which the water can percolate.

Conjunctive Water Management in California
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restrict the movement of groundwater.49 The
amount of energy that is required to extract
water from a well will depend upon the porosity of the material in the basin as well as the
depth of the basin. Thus, a basin that is located
close to the surface and comprised of porous
material would be the most economical site for
a conjunctive use project.50
d. Groundwater Quality
Considerations
Under a conjunctive use management
scheme, native groundwater will commingle
with imported surface water. The quality of the
water that is later extracted, as well as the water
that is contained within the basin, will be
affected by both sources. To ensure that neither
source of water is unacceptably degraded, the
relative quality of both must be assessed prior
to instituting the conjunctive use program.
The quality of the native groundwater will
be affected by the permeability of the surface
land overlying the aquifer. For example, if an
unconfined aquifer lies under an area of agricultural development, the return flow from irrigation may carry with it various salts, pesticides
and other pollutants it picks up when it leaches
through the surface soil. This percolating return
flow can increase the level of contaminants in
the aquifer and render the water stored within
the basin unfit for some uses. Thus, a conjunctive use program may need to include control
over the type of uses to which the land overlying the basin can be dedicated.
As noted above, the operation of a conjunctive use project frequently involves the recharge
and discharge of large amounts of water from a
basin. The fluctuation in water levels can result
in the change of gradient within the basin and
49. See CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE VOL. 1, supra note 2, at
3-48 to 3-49.
50. There may be risk associated with storing water within
such a basin, however. First, a basin that is close to the surface is
more susceptible to contamination from activities occurring on
land overlying the basin. Second, the hydraulic conductivity of a
basin controls the mobility of contaminants within a basin. When
contaminants reach a basin which is comprised of highly porous
material, the contaminants will migrate through the basin at a fast
rate and thereby impact the quality of all the water stored within
the basin.

280

Volume 6, Numbers 2 & 3

thereby alter the rate or direction of groundwater flow. This change in groundwater flow can
have several negative effects on the quality of
water stored within the basin. For example,
“groundwater replenishment can result in accelerated groundwater degradation by forcing contaminated water in the basin to flow towards
wells.”51 The withdrawal of project water also
can exacerbate pollution problems within a
basin by hastening the rate at which pollutants
are dispersed throughout the aquifer.52 The level
and location of contaminants within a basin
should, therefore, be assessed before project
water is recharged into it.
Moreover, the sudden draw down of water
during times of extraction can cause water of
lesser quality to migrate into the basin from a
hydrologically connected aquifer or body of surface water. When a basin is adjacent to an ocean
or a saline aquifer, for example, the withdrawal
of water can allow for intrusion of saltwater into
the freshwater aquifer and, if the intrusion
occurs in large quantities, render the water
stored within the basin unusable without treatment.53 The fact that a basin is adjacent to a
saltwater body or a contaminated basin, however, does not necessarily render it unsuitable for
a groundwater storage project. The operation of
a conjunctive use project is likely to result in
higher groundwater levels than would occur
without the project, even during times when
project water is extracted. If the groundwater
levels are maintained at a sufficiently high level,
the contaminated water will not migrate into
the basin. Moreover, even if the water table is
significantly lowered during extraction, the flow
of water from an adjacent system can be prevented by the use of injection wells to create a
hydraulic barrier and block the movement of
51. Susan M. Trager, Emerging Forums for Groundwater Dispute
Resolution in California: A Glimpse at the Second Generation of Groundwater
Issues and How Agencies Work Towards Problem Resolution, 20 PAC. L. J. 31,
41 (1988).
52. See Gregory, supra note 13, at 229.
53. See Kenneth A. Hodson, The Dormant Commerce Clause and
the Constitutionality of Intrastate Groundwater Management Programs, 62
TEX. L. REV. 537, 541 (1983). The presence of saline in water significantly limits the uses to which water can be applied. “If as little as
two percent of the water in affected portion of the aquifer is saline,
water from the aquifer is unfit for human consumption.” Id.
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2. Definition and Priority of Water Rights
California has separate legal regimes for
allocating and managing surface water and
groundwater. When the two systems intersect,
as happens under a conjunctive use program,
the complexity of the disparate legal regimes
creates uncertainty as to how conflicts
between different water users will be resolved.
This uncertainty may discourage participation
in conjunctive use programs. For a conjunctive
use program to function, parties who depend
on each source of water must have assurances
that their rights will not be impaired.
a. Surface Water Rights
Under a conjunctive use program, parties
with rights to surface water voluntarily place a
portion of their supply in a groundwater basin.
“There are three rights that are necessary for an
imported groundwater banking project: the
right to place water in storage, the right to protect water while it is being stored, and the right
to withdraw the water for use.”55 A surface water
user can place water in a basin either by contracting with overlying landowners or by purchasing land overlying a basin and maintaining
replenishment facilities. Before transporting
water to the basin, the party holding surface
water rights will need assurances that the
basin has sufficient available storage space to
accept the project water. To protect the water
while it is in storage, the owner of surface
water rights must have legal assurance that she
will retain title to the water and can, therefore,
prevent others from interfering with her right.
54. Several water agencies have used injection wells to prevent the influx of seawater into overdrafted groundwater basins.
See, e.g., Trager, supra note 51, at 40 (discussing a program implemented by the Los Angeles County Flood Control District and the
Orange County Water District).
55.

Kletzing, supra note 26, at 1246.

56. See, e.g., Alpaugh Irrigation Dist. v. City of Riverside,
113 Cal. App. 2d 286, 292 (1950). DWR defines “safe yield” as “the

The surface water user also must have some
authority to prevent others from taking actions
which would result in the degradation of the
quality of the water so stored. Finally, the surface water user must have the ability to extract
the water from the basin in times of shortage
and to transport the water to places of use
wherever the need occurs.
b. Groundwater Rights
A conjunctive use project also may affect
the rights of parties who depend on groundwater. To encourage parties who control the management of groundwater basins to participate
in such projects, as well as to ensure that the
operation of such a program does not result in
the unacceptable impairment of vested rights,
groundwater users must have assurances that
native groundwater supplies will not be diminished and that the quality of water will not be
degraded due to the operation of the project.
Groundwater users currently have the right to
utilize the safe yield of a groundwater basin.56 If
imported water fills all the useable storage in a
groundwater basin and prevents natural
recharge from reaching the basin, the operation of a conjunctive use project could result in
the diminution of available water. Groundwater
users with rights to the native supplies must be
assured that this will not occur or that they will
be compensated for the displacement of native
recharge.57 In addition, to protect the quality of
the native supplies, groundwater users also
must have the legal authority to prevent both
the introduction of poor quality water into the
basin and the recharge or extraction practices
that could degrade the water quality. Finally,
groundwater users will need assurances that
the extraction of imported water will not interfere with their existing wells.

maximum quantity of water that can be continuously withdrawn
from a groundwater basin without adverse effect.” CAL. DEP’T OF
WATER RESOURCES, BULL. 118, CALIFORNIA’S GROUNDWATER 4 (1975). A
number of water managers and commentators have criticized the
concept of safe yield as being inherently subjective and hydrologically unsound. See Weber, supra note 9, at 673-77; Kletzing,
supra note 26, at 1242-44.
57.

See Robie & Donovan, supra note 25, at 55.
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water into the basin.54 It is important that the
proximity of a contaminated water source be
assessed, however, before a conjunctive use
project is implemented so that the potential
risk of contamination and the cost of prevention can be evaluated.
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3. Other Externalities
The operation of a conjunctive use program has the potential to infringe on the property rights of nonparticipants and to cause
environmental damage, including subsidence
of surface land, permanent loss of groundwater
storage capacity through compaction, flooding
of overlying lands, degradation of the quality of
water stored in the basin, interference with the
water rights of non-participants in the program, impairment of overlying wells, reduction
in native groundwater supply and damage to
surface vegetation. Before the benefits of a
conjunctive use project can be accurately evaluated, these risks must be assessed.
a. Land Subsidence
Aquifers are composed of compressible
material. When water is withdrawn from an
aquifer, the pressure within it may be reduced
and may result in the compaction of the water
bearing strata.58 When the materials within an
aquifer compress, the overlying surface may
subside. Subsidence can adversely affect the
physical integrity of surface structures such as
roads, buildings and water distribution systems; alter the gradients and drainage patterns
of canals and irrigated land; and cause low
lying areas to become submerged.59 Depletion
of groundwater supplies has caused land subsidence in California in the past. For example,
parts of the Santa Clara Valley subsided by
more than thirteen feet between 1933 and 1967
as a result of overdraft of the underlying
basin.60
Indeed, the very existence of conjunctive
management may increase the risk of subsidence. Under a typical conjunctive use
scheme, water is withdrawn from an aquifer
when surface water supplies are scarce. During
these times, the natural recharge of the basin
also is reduced. Therefore, the sudden withdrawal of large quantities of water stored within the basin can result in a significant reduc58.

See Peterson, supra note 11, at 1395.

59.

See Amandes, supra note 31.

60.

See id. at 1213.

61.

See Peterson, supra note 11, at 1396.

62.

See Amandes, supra note 31, at 1210.
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tion of the pressure within an aquifer and
cause it to collapse. If a groundwater basin historically has experienced large fluctuations in
water levels without experiencing subsistence,
however, the risk of subsidence from conjunctive use may be minimal.
b. Loss of Basin Storage Capacity
When a groundwater basin compacts, the
finer sediments within the water bearing strata
lose porosity.61 The pore space reduction caused
by the compaction reduces the amount of water
that the aquifer can store. This deformation of
an aquifer’s sediments is irreversible, and the
basin’s lost storage capacity can never be recovered.62 The loss of storage space, thus, diminishes the ability of the water managers to use
groundwater basins to their fullest potential.
c. Flooding
During years of high precipitation, the natural recharge of water into a groundwater basin
can cause it to fill to overflowing.63 During such
periods, water tables may rise to the surface
and cause flooding of overlying land.64 If a
groundwater basin does not have adequate
storage space available, the operation of a conjunctive use program may exacerbate the risk of
overfill and flooding.
d. Degradation of Water Quality
The operation of a conjunctive use project
also can result in the degradation of the quality
of water stored within a basin. The effects of
such degradation are not limited to those who
use the groundwater. If the aquifer is hydrologically connected to a surface water system, the
contamination of groundwater resources can
impair the ecosystem that depends on the connected water system.65

63.

See Anderson, supra note 17, at 570.

64. See id. (describing the damage that the City of San
Bernardino suffered when, as a result of natural recharge and a
groundwater recharge program, the Bunker Hill basin flooded low
lying land in the city).
65.

See Gregory, supra note 13, at 238.
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4. Incentives for Participation
As the foregoing indicates, there are significant costs and risks associated with participation in conjunctive use programs. In most
cases, the parties involved in the program will
have to install pumps, monitoring wells and
recharge facilities. In some cases, they may
have to construct a water transportation system
or secure the right to use existing conveyance
facilities. The transaction costs of conjunctive
management also may be significant because
the parties will need to broker agreements to
establish methods for obtaining surface water
for import and recharge, schedules for recharging into and extracting water from the basin,
and a means of supervising compliance with
the agreements.
In addition, the operation of a conjunctive
use program has the potential to impair the
water rights of third parties. Disputes over
66.

See Hodson, supra note 53, at 541.

67. See Kletzing, supra note 26, at 1227; Frank J. Trelease,
Legal Solutions to Groundwater Problems: A General Overview, 11 PAC. L.
J. 863, 867-68 (1980).
68. See Kletzing, supra note 26, at 1229 (estimating that the
granting of a preliminary injunction to a party challenging the
legality of the Kern County Water Bank could cost the DWR six to
eight million dollars in interest expenses alone).
69. See Kevin Neese, Tehama County Groundwater Management
Ordinance, in MAKING THE CONNECTIONS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH
BIENNIAL CONFERENCE ON GROUNDWATER 47, 48 (J.J. DeVeries & J.
Woled eds. 1996) [hereinafter MAKING THE CONNECTIONS].
70. See, e.g., Federal Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
1531-1543 (1988); Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L.
No. 102-575, §§ 3401-3412, 106 Stat. 4706 (1992); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387; Fish and Wildlife

groundwater rights usually are both protracted
and costly.67 If the third party’s challenge is successful, the participants in the conjunctive use
program may lose the benefits of their invested
capital. Even if the legal challenge is ultimately
unsuccessful, the project may be delayed if a
court issues a preliminary injunction and such
delay could be lengthy and costly.68
Additionally, the participants in the program
run the risk of incurring liabilities for third party
damages that result from operation of the program. Therefore, to encourage parties to voluntarily participate in conjunctive use programs,
it is essential that these types of risks be minimized and that liability to third parties be clearly assigned.
III. Legal and Institutional Regimes for
Regulation of Groundwater
The California Water Code does not comprehensively regulate the use of groundwater.
Consequently, groundwater management has
evolved through a combination of appellate
court decisions and local agency rulemaking.69
Overlying these rules are myriad state and federal statutes,70 Article X, Section 2 of the
California Constitution, and a variety of contracts that interact to direct how particular
groundwater resources are allocated and used.
The story of California groundwater rights, thus,
is the story of the development of these decentralized rules and the tensions among them.
Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution is the cornerstone of California’s water
law and policy.71 It requires that all uses of water
Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666; California Environmental
Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000 (West 1992 & Supp.
1993); California Endangered Species Act, CAL. FISH & GAME CODE
§ 2050 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
71. Article X, Section 2 declares, inter alia, “that because of
conditions prevailing in this state the general welfare requires
that the water resources of the state be put to beneficial use to
the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or
unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water is prevented, and that the conservation of such water is to be exercised
with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the
interest of the people and for the public welfare. The right to
water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream
or water course in this state is and shall be limited to such water
as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be
served, and such right does and shall not extend to the waste or
unreasonable method of diversion.” Cal. Const. art. X, § 2.
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e. Impairment of Wells
Finally, when water is pumped from an
aquifer, a cone of depression in the water table
is created around the point of extraction. If a
large quantity of water is withdrawn over a
short period of time, the cone of depression
created by the pumping may significantly lower
the water levels in the area surrounding the
extraction facility. This draw-down can temporarily impair the flow of water to neighboring
wells. Further, if the extraction of the project
water substantially lowers the water table,
existing wells may have to be deepened and
more energy will have to be expended to pump
water from greater depths.66
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be both reasonable and beneficial. No one can
obtain or hold a water right unless the water is
used in a reasonable manner, for a beneficial
purpose and through a reasonable method of
diversion. The California Water Code authorizes the State Water Resources Control Board
(“SWRCB” or “Board”) to take all appropriate
measures to prevent the waste or misuse of
any water in the state.72 Thus, all water users
are subject to the reasonable use requirement.
California recognizes several categories of
water rights, each based on hydrological characteristics. Rights in surface water are governed by the doctrines of riparianism and prior
appropriation.73 Rights to subterranean waters
are based on ownership of overlying land and
appropriation.74 According to the California
Supreme Court, “[c]onceptually, what is meant
by a water right is the right to use the water—
to divert it from its natural course.”75 This right
to use water is a real property right,76 and real
property remedies, therefore, are available for
invasions of water rights.77
The right to use groundwater depends on
the geological formation in which the water is
found. “For legal purposes, underground
waters are divided into three categories: (1) the
underflow of surface stream; (2) a definite
underground stream; and (3) percolating
72.

CAL. WATER CODE § 275 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).

73. See United States v. State Water Resources Control
Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 101 (1986).
74.

See LITTLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 16, at 47-53.
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waters.”78 Underflow and water in underground
streams are subject to the rules governing
rights in surface water.79 To acquire a right in
underflow or water in underground streams,
one must either own land contiguous to the
watercourse of which the underflow or underground stream is a part or obtain a permit or
license from the SWRCB to use such water.80
California law presumes that all subterranean water is percolating.81 A claimant who
wants to appropriate groundwater through the
statutory procedure has the burden of proving
that the water is part of an underground stream
system.82 Percolating waters include water in
underground basins and groundwater that has
escaped from streams.83 As discussed below,
common law principles govern the allocation
of percolating groundwater. The California legislature consistently has followed a hands-off
policy with regard to the regulation of groundwater rights.84 These rights are generally not
defined or quantified.
A. Acquisition of Groundwater Rights
“Water begins its juridical life as the quintessential public resource: owned by no one
individual but held in common by all.”85 One
can convert the publicly-owned water into private property “by appropriation in the manner
(1938); City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 623-35
(1890); Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal. 2d 549, 557-62 (1944); CAL.
WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
80.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).

81.

See Pomeroy, 124 Cal. at 628, 633-34.

75. State Water Resources Control Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d at
100. Before 1903, the right to percolating waters was controlled
by the same common law principles that governed rights over
rocks and minerals contained in land. The owner of land overlying percolating waters had absolute ownership in and control of
the use of the percolating waters and adjacent landowners could
not prevent an overlying owner from diverting all groundwater
found under his land even where such diversion injured the adjacent owner’s groundwater rights. See 62 CAL. JUR. 3d § 394 (1981).
In Katz v. Walkinshaw, the California Supreme Court rejected the
common law rule of absolute ownership of percolating waters
and adopted the doctrine of correlative rights under which all
proprietors of land overlying a groundwater basin share in common the right to use the groundwater. 141 Cal. 138 (1903).

82. In determining whether groundwater is percolating or
part of a stream system, a court considers the following factors:
whether the water flows through a defined channel, the direction
and rate of the subsurface flow, and the relationship between the
surface and subsurface hydrographs. See Cave v. Tyler, 147 Cal.
454, 456 (1905); Larsen v. Appollonio, 5 Cal. 2d 440, 444 (1936);
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Legal Disconnections Between Surface Water
and Ground Water, in MAKING THE CONNECTIONS, supra note 69, at 21.
See also Arroyo Ditch & Water Co. v. Baldwin, 155 Cal. 280, 284
(1909) (one claiming a right in groundwater has the burden of
proving that the water is part of a flowing stream); Russell
Kletzing, supra note 26, at 1232-33. See generally Wells A. Hutchins,
California Ground Water: Legal Problems, 45 CAL. L. REV. 688 (1957).

76.
(1920).

83. See Montecito Valley Water Co. v. City of Santa Barbara,
144 Cal. 578, 584 (1904).

See Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Miller & Lux, 183 Cal. 71, 81

77. See Miller & Lux v. Enterprise Canal & Land Co., 169
Cal. 71, 81 (1915).
78.

LITTLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 16, at 48.

79.

See Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 536
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84.

See Thompson, supra note 5, at 722.

85. Gregory A. Thomas, Conserving Aquatic Biodiversity: A
Critical Comparison of Legal Tools for Augmenting Streamflows in
California, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3, 12 (1996).
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86.

CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).

87.

141 Cal. 116 (1903).

88.

Id. at 138.

89.

See id.

90.

See id.

91.

Id. at 123-38.

92.

See id. at 128.

93.

See id. at 134-36.

94.

See id.

rights.93 Under this doctrine, all overlying
landowners have an equal right to the beneficial use of water. Where there is insufficient
supply to meet the overlying owners’ demands,
all must equally share in the shortage.94
Groundwater that is surplus to the reasonable and beneficial needs of the overlying
owners is available for appropriation for use
outside the basin.95 Unlike surface water,
underflow or underground stream water, there
is no statutory procedure for perfecting an
appropriative right to groundwater.96 Moreover,
no centralized agency makes the determination of whether a basin contains water that is
available for appropriation.97 One gains an
appropriative right to groundwater simply by
taking it and applying it to a beneficial use.98
Appropriative rights are governed by the “first
in time, first in right” doctrine. If overlying
owners require the full safe yield of a basin to
satisfy their reasonable, beneficial uses, however, no surplus exists and no water is available for appropriation.99 The correlative rights
of overlying landowners, like riparian rights,
do not depend upon use and are not lost by
nonuse.100
Public purveyors of groundwater may not
assert the overlying rights of their customers;
rather, they must exercise appropriative
rights.101 Thus, the rights of private overlying
users are technically paramount to the needs
97. By contrast, section 1375 of the Water Code provides
that the SWRCB must make a determination that unappropriated
water is available before it can grant a permit. The Water Code
further provides that A[i]n determining the amount of water
available for appropriation, the board shall take into account,
whenever it is in the public interest, the amounts of water needed to remain in the source for protecting beneficial uses, including any uses specified to be protected in any relevant water quality control plan established pursuant to Division 7 (commencing
with Section 13000) of this code.” CAL. WATER CODE § 1243.5 (West
1992 & Supp. 1993).
98.

See Hutchins, supra note 82, at 688.

95. See Id. at 135-36; see also Tehachapi-Cummings County
Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1001 (1975). “A
groundwater basin is in a state of surplus when the amount of
water being extracted is less than the maximum that could be
withdrawn without adverse effects on the basin’s long term supply. Overdraft commences whenever extractions increase, or the
withdrawable maximum decreases, or both, to the point where
the surplus ends.” Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 174 Cal. App. 3d
368, 371 n.2 (1985).

99. See Corona Foothill Lemon Co. v. Lillibridge, 8 Cal. 2d
522, 531 (1937); see also Monolith Portland Cement Co. v. Mojave
Pub. Util. Dist., 154 Cal. App. 2d 487, 494 (1957).

96. CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); see
also Katz, 141 Cal. at 134-35.

101. See City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 186
Cal. 7, 25 (1921); see also Orange County Water Dist. v. City of
Riverside, 173 Cal. App. 2d 137, 165 (1959).

100. See, e.g., Hudson v. Dailey, 156 Cal. 617, 627-28 (1909);
Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co., 160 Cal. 268, 280; City of San
Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 25 (1921); Orange
County Water Dist. v. City of Riverside, 173 Cal.App.2d 137, 165
(1959).
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provided by law.”86 Because the state legislature
has generally not regulated groundwater, “the
manner provided by law” has been judicially
defined. Over the last 100 years, the courts have
developed the majority of rules relating to the
character and scope of groundwater rights in
California.
The California Supreme Court established
the basic rule governing groundwater rights in
Katz v. Walkinshaw.87 In Katz, the plaintiffs were
overlying landowners who had used groundwater obtained from artesian wells to irrigate
their land for twenty years.88 The defendant, an
owner of land overlying the same aquifer as the
plaintiffs’ land, extracted groundwater and sold
it for use on non-overlying land.89 The plaintiffs
alleged that continuation of the defendant’s
water exportation had destroyed the artesian
head of their wells, effectively prohibiting the
continued use of their property.90
The court in Katz concluded that, due to
California’s arid climate, the ends of justice
would not be served by adopting the English
common law rule of absolute ownership of percolating groundwater.91 It recognized that,
because water is a scarce resource in
California, the rule of absolute ownership
would result in unacceptable uncertainty in
titles to water rights.92 Instead, the court
adopted the rule of reasonable use of percolating waters and the doctrine of correlative
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of public agencies that depend on groundwater.102 In overdrafted basins, however, public
agencies may establish prescriptive rights
against private groundwater users. Such prescriptive rights may become superior to the
overlying landowners’ rights. Additionally,
intervening public use may limit a private
owner’s water rights remedy to damages, in
place of an injunction, where public policy
considerations require a reallocation of water
rights.103
An importer of water has an exclusive right
to recapture the return flow104 attributed to its
deliveries of imported water105 to users in a
basin.106 Additionally, public agencies are entitled to use underground basins for temporary
storage of imported water by means of artificial recharge and subsequent recapture and to
protect the water so stored from expropriation
by others.107 The owner of stored water has a
right to extract an equivalent amount, less
losses.108 “No statewide permit system exists
for the allocation of underground storage
capacity, nor is the permission of landowners
overlying the storage area required in order to
store imported water underground.”109 The
importer of stored water may be liable, however, for third-party damages that result from
the storage project.110
B. Limitations on Groundwater Rights
Although some observers contend that
there is no groundwater management program in California,111 there are a variety of
methods by which groundwater basins are
managed, and a number of important basins
are tightly regulated. While no agency has
102.

See LITTLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 16, at 51.

103.

See id. at 51.

104. Where diverted surface water or pumped groundwater is applied to surface use, a certain amount of water is not consumed but rather percolated back into the ground. This water is
called “return flow.”
105. “Imported water” is “foreign water imported from a
different watershed.” City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando,
14 Cal. 3d 199, 261 n.51 (1975).
106.

See id. at 262.

107.

See id. at 263-64.

108.

See id.

109.

LITTLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 16, at 51.
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comprehensive authority to define the character or extent of groundwater rights, the courts
have jurisdiction to determine some groundwater rights and to limit pumping through
adjudication. The role of the courts in determining groundwater rights has evolved over
the last hundred years from a narrow one of
resolving discrete conflicts between groundwater users to a broad one of developing comprehensive plans for allocation of groundwater in particular basins. In addition, the
California Water Code grants the SWRCB and
various local agencies some groundwater
management authority. By virtue of their
police power, cities and counties also can regulate some aspects of groundwater use.
Finally, various federal and state statutes may
affect a water user’s exercise of its groundwater rights.
1. Adjudication
Adjudication is a method of regulating
groundwater use in basins that are in a state
of overdraft.112 When a basin is in overdraft
there is no surplus water available for the
acquisition or enlargement of appropriative
rights. Appropriations in excess of the surplus
invade senior appropriators’ and overlying
owners’ water rights, which usually entitle
them to an injunction.113 One product of the
adjudication is judicial determination of the
nature and quantity of each groundwater
user’s share of the basin’s safe yield.114
In defining a groundwater user’s water
rights, the court must consider the reasonableness of each use. The determination of
what is a reasonable use of water will vary with
110. See Anderson, supra note 17, at 570 (discussing damage that resulted to streets, building and pipelines in San
Bernardino when natural and intentional recharge combined to
cause the Bunker Hill Basin to overflow).
111. See, e.g., Eric L. Garner et al., Institutional Reforms in
California Groundwater Law, 25 PAC. L.J. 1021, 1022 (1994) (describing California groundwater law as “the right to pump as much
water as possible until one is sued”).
112.
113.
(1950).
114.

See Neese, supra note 69, at 48.
See People v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 695
See Neese, supra note 69, at 49.

115. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v.
Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 567 (1935).
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What may be a reasonable beneficial
use, where water is present in excess of
all needs, would not be a reasonable
beneficial use in an area of great scarcity and great need. What is a beneficial
use at one time, may because of
changed conditions, become a waste of
water at a later time.116
The inquiry into the reasonableness of a
particular use also must include what the
Supreme Court has called “state-wide considerations of transcendent importance.”117 The
Court has stated that a paramount consideration in making this determination is “the ever
increasing need for the conservation of water in
this state, an inescapable reality of life quite
apart from its express recognition in [Article X,
Section 2].”118 Thus, a court adjudicating the
rights of producers in a particular basin has the
duty to consider the reasonableness of a particular use in the broader context of current water
needs of all of California. If a producer’s use is
found to be unreasonable given competing
demands, either basin-wide or state-wide, the
court can find that the producer has no right to
use such water.119 The California Supreme Court
has not yet decided whether Article X, Section 2
requires the optimal use of water, or if it simply
prohibits the wasteful use of water.120
116.
117.
(1967)

Id.

126.

Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 140

127.

174 Cal. App. 3d at 86.

128.

See id. at 87.

118.

Id.

119.

See id.

120. See LITTLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 16, at 69; see also
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 447 n.28
(1983).
121.

While a court has the authority to determine the existence, extent and character of a
groundwater user’s exercised rights, a court
cannot determine the prospective rights of
overlying landowners. In Wright v. Goleta Water
District,121 the court of appeal held that a judicial
determination of basin rights is only binding on
parties to the litigation because an adjudication
of groundwater rights is essentially a private
lawsuit.122 In Wright, the court rejected the trial
judge’s decision to subordinate an unexercised
overlying right to an exercised appropriative
right.123 The trial court had based its holding
upon the California Supreme Court’s reasoning
in In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System.124
Long Valley held that the SWRCB could relegate
unexercised riparian rights to the lowest priority in a basin-wide statutory adjudication of surface water rights.125 The Long Valley court recognized that, in this context, uncertainty concerning water rights could inhibit long-range planning and foster litigation.126
In Wright, the court of appeal observed that
such concerns should apply with “equal vigor”
to groundwater since the legislature had failed
to enact a groundwater regulatory scheme to
carry out the state’s constitutional water policies.127 The court concluded, however, that the
doctrine of stare decisis, as well as due process
concerns, prevented it from redefining a nonparty’s groundwater rights.128 The court stressed
the fundamental difference between judicial
determination of groundwater rights and the
SWRCB’s adjudication procedures at issue in
Long Valley.129 In a statutory adjudication, the
SWRCB engages in a comprehensive and final

174 Cal. App. 3d 74 (1985).

122. Id. at 87-89.
123. Id.
124.

25 Cal. 3d 339 (1979); see also 174 Cal. App. 3d at 86.

125.

25 Cal. 3d at 359.

Id. at 355.

129. See id. at 86-90. The California Water Code expressly
authorizes the SWRCB “to determine [in a stream system adjudication proceeding] all rights to water of a stream system whether
based upon appropriation, riparian right, or other basis of right.”
CAL. WATER CODE § 2501 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
130. The California Water Code provides that it is the duty
of all claimants to appear and submit proof of their claims in a
statutory adjudication proceeding. A claimant who fails to appear
“shall be barred and estopped from subsequently asserting any
rights theretofore acquired and shall be held to have forfeited all
rights to water theretofore claimed by him on the stream system,
other than as provided in the decree, unless entitled to relief
under the laws of this state.” Id. § 2774.
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the facts and circumstances of each particular
case.115 A court adjudicating a groundwater
basin must consider the needs of all other users
of the groundwater. As the California Supreme
Court held:
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determination of all water rights in the system.130
The court reasoned that this consideration
“transcend[s] those at stake in a private dispute between a limited number of parties.”131
While an overlying owner cannot lose
her rights to use water in an underground
basin by nonuse, 132 she may lose them
through prescription.133 When an appropriator
takes water from a basin that is not surplus,
she invades overlying owners’ and senior
appropriators’ right to use the groundwater.134
An appropriator’s extraction and export of
non-surplus water may ripen into a prescriptive right when the essential elements of
adverse possession are met.135 In particular,
the overlying owner must have notice of the
adverse use.136 Moreover, the basin must be in
a continuous state of overdraft for the prescriptive period.137 A prescriptive right entitles the adverse user to use the water for the
specific purpose for which the water has historically been used and in a specific quantity.138
The doctrine of mutual prescription
adopted by the Supreme Court in Pasadena v.
Alhambra139 fundamentally shaped groundwa-

Volume 6, Numbers 2 & 3

ter adjudications. Under this law, when a
basin does not contain sufficient water to
satisfy the needs of the overlying producers
over a protracted period, all appropriators
and overlying owners invade each other’s
water rights. Therefore, each user can gain
prescriptive rights vis-a-vis all other users.140
The court can limit pumping to the basin’s
safe yield141 and require all users proportionately to reduce their extractions. 142
Groundwater rights are allocated on the basis
of historic pumping rates, as represented by
the five prior years of record for each extractor.143
The California Supreme Court modified
the doctrine of mutual prescription in Los
Angeles v. San Fernando.144 The court held that
section 1007 of the Civil Code prohibits prescriptive rights from accruing against public
agencies and public utilities.145 This limitation
is particularly significant because there are
“not many groundwater basins that do not
have some public users.”146 Thus, individuals
are prohibited from gaining mutual prescriptive rights to much of the groundwater in
California and run the risk of losing their water

131.

Long Valley, 25 Cal. 3d at 360.

140.

See id. at 933.

132.

See Hudson v. Dailey, 156 Cal. 617, 627-28 (1909).

141.

See id. at 924.

142.

See id. at 936.

143.

See id.

144.

14 Cal. 3d 199 (1975).

133. It is not clear, however, whether overlying rights that
have not yet been exercised can be lost by prescription. In a cryptic footnote, the California Supreme Court has stated that the
prescriptive rights of appropriators “would not necessarily impair
the private defendants’ right to ground water for new overlying
uses for which the need had not yet come into existence during
the prescriptive period.” City of Los Angeles v. City of San
Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 293 n.100 (1975).
134. See City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d
908, 929 (1949).
135. To obtain a prescriptive water right, the use must be
reasonable and beneficial, open and notorious, adverse and hostile, continuous and uninterrupted for a period of five years,
exclusive and under claim of right. See Saxon v. DuBois, 209 Cal.
App. 2d 713, 719 (1962).
136. See Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 282
(1975) (stating that a prescriptive period does not commence
until water users with paramount rights have notice that an overdraft exists); See also Pasadena, 33 Cal. 2d at 930 (holding that the
long-term lowering of water levels is sufficient to charge owners
with notice of deficiency).
137. See City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14
Cal. 3d at 284.
138. See City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 186
Cal. 7, 25, 31 (1921).
139.

33 Cal. 2d 908 (1949).
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145. The court stated that “occupancy for the period prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure as sufficient to bar any
action for the recovery of the property confers a title thereto,
denominated by a title by prescription, which is sufficient against
all, but no possession by any person, firm or corporation no matter how long continued of any land, water, water right, easement,
or other property whatsoever dedicated to a public use by a public utility, or dedicated to or owned by the state or any public
entity, shall ever ripen into any title, interest or right against the
owner thereof.” Id. at 270 n.66.
146.

Kletzing, supra note 26, at 1238.

147. See id. at 1227 (noting that the San Fernando decision
reduced the incentive for private users to instigate basin adjudication proceeding because public agencies whose withdrawal of
water from the basin would be protected from loss of rights by
prescription); see also Thompson, supra note 5, at 686-700 (discussing the dominant role that local water institutions play in
allocating and managing water resources in the western United
States).

WEST

tification accommodates internal water transfers.”155 Courts also have the flexibility individually to address problems that are specific to the
basin and to craft equitable remedies tailored
to address the unique conditions of the basin.
There are several concomitant drawbacks
to the adjudication process, however.
Groundwater adjudication is generally a timeconsuming and costly process.156 The participants are required to forfeit their rights independently to devise solutions to future problems and to abdicate control over their water
use practices to the court and watermaster.
Moreover, water users only have an incentive
to utilize the adjudicative process to define
water rights when a basin has suffered a protracted period of overdraft. Because a basin
and the water contained within it can be
severely damaged by long periods of overdraft,
water users are unlikely to use the adjudicative
process to ensure that the basin is maintained
in its most productive state. Finally, the very
nature of the adjudicative process requires
judges to make important policy decisions
without legislative guidance.157
2. State Water Resources Control
Board
While the California Water Code assigns
the primary duty of regulating water resources
to the State Water Resources Control Board,158
it does not grant the Board direct regulatory
to limit pumping for quality reasons).

148. See San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 270-77, 286-87. Because
San Fernando involved public importers of water, it is not entirely
clear whether a party could gain prescriptive rights against a private importer of water. It seems likely, however, that the policy
reasons for exempting public importers from the doctrine of prescriptive rights would apply with equal vigor to private importers
and a court would find that prescriptive rights do not attach to
imported water. See id. at 261 (noting that the reason for giving
priority to users who import water is “to credit the importer with
the fruits of his expenditures and endeavors in bringing into the
basin water that would not otherwise be there”).
149. See ANNE J. SCHNEIDER, GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN
CALIFORNIA, GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER
RIGHTS 53-58 (1977) (describing watermaster management).
150.

See id. at 22-25.

151.

See id.

152. See, e.g., Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore
Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 524-25 (1935).
153. See BLOMQUIST, supra note 19, at 175-76 (discussing
how the San Gabriel Basin watermaster had to petition the court

154. See id. For example, the court granted the watermaster for the San Gabriel Basin the authority to limit extracts to help
prevent the spread of contaminants within the basin and to facilitate remediation in 1990. In 1991, the court approved the watermaster’s plan for implementing this authority. Similar water quality authority was granted to the Upper Los Angeles River Area
watermaster in 1993. See CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF WATER RESOURCES,
WATER FACTS NO. 3: ADJUDICATED GROUNDWATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA
(1996).
155.

Neese, supra note 69, at 49.

156. For example, it took twenty years to adjudicate the
San Fernando Basin and the adjudication of the Raymond Basin
took twelve years to complete. See Garner et al., supra note 111, at
1023; see also BLOMQUIST, supra note 19, at 73-95 (describing the
adjudication proceedings in the Raymond Basin); 97-126 (analyzing the problems and solutions developed in the West Basin proceedings); 127-58 (discussing the Central Basin).
157.
(1985).

See Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 174 Cal. App. 3d 368

158. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200-1851 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1993).
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rights to public agencies.147 The court further
limited the potential impact of prescriptive
rights by holding that users of the native supply in the basin cannot gain prescriptive
rights to imported water stored in a basin.148
Once a court has determined the relative
rights of water users in a basin, it usually will
appoint a watermaster to manage the basin.149
The court order often grants the watermaster
authority to charge groundwater producers special assessments to cover the cost of administering the judgment.150 In many adjudicated
basins, the watermaster also is empowered to
operate replenishment programs to prevent
future overdrafts.151 Once a groundwater basin
is adjudicated, the trial court usually retains
jurisdiction to modify its orders as conditions
may change.152 Generally, a watermaster does
not have the power to regulate the extractions
of groundwater to control the movement of
contamination in a basin or the land use practices of overlying land owners to prevent contamination in a recharge area.153 The watermaster may petition the court, however, to modify
the order to allow the watermaster to regulate
some additional aspects of groundwater extraction and management.154
Basin-wide adjudication can increase the
certainty of water rights because the outcome
includes defined and quantified pumping
rights. “Definition of water rights allows for prioritization in the event of shortage and quan-
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jurisdiction over groundwater.159 The SWRCB
does have some authority, however, to regulate
groundwater rights. The SWRCB has concurrent jurisdiction with the courts to enforce the
reasonable and beneficial use requirement of
Article X, Section 2 on all water uses.160 Section
275 of the Water Code further provides that
DWR and the Board “shall take all appropriate
proceedings or actions before executive, legislative, or judicial agencies to prevent waste,
unreasonable use, unreasonable method of
use or unreasonable method of diversion of
water in this state.”161 The SWRCB also “has
broad authority to define reasonable water use,
to investigate alleged misuses, and to order the
violating party to correct the misuse through
various means, including implementation of
water conservation measures”162 and it is “the
primary state agency with jurisdiction over the
implementation and enforcement of federal
and state water quality law.”163
Although the California Water Code does
not authorize the SWRCB to determine groundwater rights in a statutory adjudication of a
stream system,164 it can act as a referee to court
159.

See id. at § 1202.

160. See Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources
Control Bd. [hereinafter IID I], 186 Cal. App. 3d 1160, 1162-63,
1171 (1986) (finding that the SWRCB has the authority to adjudicate the constitutional issue of the unreasonable use of water);
Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd.
[hereinafter IID II], 225 Cal. App. 3d 548, 561 (1990) (concluding
that the SWRCB had the power to establish standards of reasonableness and to determine whether the irrigation practices of the
district were reasonable or wasteful). The Board has been reluctant to exercise its authority under the reasonable use doctrine to
reduce a user’s water rights, or to require users to implement
conservation methods, because of the expense involved in investigating waste and improving water efficiency. See, e.g., George W.
Pring & Karen A. Tomb, License to Waste: Legal Barriers to Conservation
and Efficient Use of Water in the West, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 251, 25-8 to 25-32 (1972); Steven J. Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law:
A Blueprint for Change, 61 OR. L. REV. 483, 485-91 (1982); but see
Thompson, supra note 5, at 729-30 (discussing SWRCB’s order
finding that the Imperial Irrigation District’s water use practices
were unreasonable and wasteful in violation of constitutional
mandate).
161.

CAL. WATER CODE § 275 (West 1992 & Supp.).

162.

Thomas, supra note 85, at 26.

163. Gray, supra note 15, at 249 n.1 (referencing CAL. WATER
CODE §§ 13000-14920 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993)).
164.

CAL. WATER CODE § 2500 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).

165.

See id. § 2000.

166.

See id.

167.

See CAL. WATER CODE § 2017; see also LITTLEWORTH &
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adjudications of groundwater basins.165 A court
can refer matters to the SWRCB to investigate
and report on any issue involved in a lawsuit
for the determination of rights to water.166 Any
party may take an exception to the Board’s findings, however, and thereby require a trial court
to conduct a de novo review.167 The SWRCB can
also initiate an adjudicative proceeding in
courts to protect groundwater quality.
3. Local Management of Groundwater
Basins
While the California Water Code does not
authorize the Board, or any other state agency,
to comprehensively regulate groundwater
rights, the legislature has granted various local
entities some authority to manage groundwater basins.168 Local water agencies play a vital
role in the allocation of the state’s water
resources, because they often hold legal title to
water rights for the benefit of their users, control extraction and conveyance facilities, and
are responsible for delivering water to consumers.169 The use of institutions to supply
water is not surprising because the economies
GARNER, supra note 16, at 106-07 (describing how the court in
Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility District, 26 Cal.
3d 327 (1980), had to conduct a lengthy trial after the parties took
exceptions to the SWRCB’s resolutions of issues).
168. California has a long history of using local districts to
fulfill a variety of public purposes. In 1887, the legislature enacted the Wright Act, which authorized the formation of irrigation
districts with the power to issue bonds and charge assessments
against all property within the district for the purpose of developing or acquiring water for irrigation uses. See DONALD WORSTER,
RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN
WEST 108-09 (1985).
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act
in Fallbrook Dist. v. Bradley,164 U.S. 122 (1896). The Court deferred
to the California legislature’s determination that the public generally, and not just those who received water deliveries from the
district, benefited from the district’s services. The Court stated:
To irrigate and thus bring into possible cultivation
these large masses of otherwise worthless lands
would seem to be a public purpose and a matter of
public interest, not confined to the landowners, or
even to any one section of the state. The fact that the
use of water is limited to the landowner is not therefore a fatal objection to this legislation. It is not essential that the entire community or even any considerable portion thereof should directly enjoy or participate in an improvement in order to constitute a public use.
Id. at 161.
169. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 5, at 686-701 (describing the role that water institutions play in the allocation of water
resources in the western United States).
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a. Special Act Districts
Through the enactment of special district
acts, the legislature has created (or authorized the creation of) public agencies to regulate groundwater use in specific basins.171
170. Id. at 689; see also Robert A. Young, Why Are There So Few
Transactions Among Water Users, AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1143, 1144
(1986); John M. McDowell & Keith R. Ugone, The Effect of Institutional
Setting on Behavior in Public Enterprises: Irrigation Districts in the Western
States, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 453, 480-82 (discussing the economies of
scale involved in storing, transporting and distributing water).
171. There are ten special Groundwater Management
Districts established under California law. See CAL. WATER CODE
APP. §§ 118-1 to 118-801 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993) (Monterey
Peninsula Water Management District), id. §§119-101 to 119-1201
(Sierra Valley Groundwater Management District), id. §§119-1301
(Long Valley Groundwater Management District), id. §§121-102 to
121-1101 (Fox Cannon Groundwater Management Agency), id. §§
124-101 to 124-1101 (Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency),
id. §§ 128-1 to 128-901 (Mono County Tri-Valley Groundwater
Management District), id. §§ 129-101 to 129-1201 (Honey Lake
Valley Groundwater District), id. §§ 131-101 to 131-1201 (Ojain
Groundwater Management Agency), id. §§ 10700. (Mendocino
Community Service District). In 1995, the legislature also authorized the formation of the Surprise Valley Groundwater
Management District. See id. §§ 137-101 to 137-1301. The voters of
the district, however, have not yet approved the formation of such
a district.
Two special act water districts, the Orange County Water
District, see id. §§ 40-1 to 40-78, and the Santa Clara Valley Water
District, id. §§ 60-1 to 69-35, have been granted groundwater management powers. These districts can levy a “basin equity assessment” or pump taxes to regulate groundwater extractions, but
they do not possess the authority to regulate groundwater extractions by ordinance. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE APP. § 40-31.5;
Weber, supra note 9, at 735.
172.
1993).

Special water districts are designed to preserve “the groundwater resources within the
territory of the agency for agricultural and
municipal and industrial uses.”172 The legislature has declared that the creation of special
groundwater districts “is in the public interest and that the creation of the [groundwater
management agencies] . . . is for the common benefit of water users.”173
Special groundwater management districts possess a wide array of tools to carry
out their mandate of protecting the groundwater basins over which they lie and the
groundwater resources within their territory.
The agencies generally are empowered to
adopt groundwater management plans when
they determine that “groundwater management activities are necessary in order to
improve or protect the quantity or quality of
groundwater supplies within a groundwater
basin or aquifer.”174 As part of a groundwater
management plan, agencies can exercise
some or all of the following powers: (1) store
and recapture water in groundwater basins
173.

Id.

174. See, e.g., id. § 119-501 (authorizing Sierra Valley
Groundwater Management District to conduct hydrological investigation and study of the basin over which the district lies), id. §
121-501 (Fox Canyon Water District), id. §124-701 (Pajaro Valley
Water Management Agency). The legislature has specifically
instructed certain groundwater management agencies to conduct
comprehensive studies of the hydrologic conditions of the basin
over which they lie. Section 131-603 of the California Water Code
provides, for example, that:
the [Ojai Groundwater Management] Agency shall undertake a groundwater management study for future extractions
from the basin. As a part of this study, the agency shall determine
the hydrologic characteristics of the basin, which shall include all
of the following information:
(1) Existing groundwater storage capacity;
(2)

Existing groundwater storage;

(3) Existing and projected groundwater use;
(4) A review of the boundaries of the basin;
(5)

The average annual variation in storage in existing groundwater storage;

(6) Projected annual rainfall, runoff, and recharge
rates;
(7) Long-term recoverable storage, including an
estimate of nonrecoverable storage; and
(8) Potential extractions and storage programs.
Id. § 131-603.

CAL. WATER CODE APP. § 121-102 (West 1992 & Supp.
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of scale involved in the development and distribution of water resources make it far less
expensive for an institution to maintain large
extraction or diversion facilities and “to
transport water to a number of consumers in
the same region than for each consumer to
collect and bring in her own water.”170 The
establishment of local agencies endowed
with some governmental powers also allows
local water users, who control water agencies
through voting rights, to overcome some of
the uncertainties engendered by California’s
complex and multi-layered system for regulating water uses and to manage water rights
equitably and efficiently. California has several different types of local agencies with the
authority to manage and regulate the state’s
groundwater re-sources.
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and surface reservoirs within their district;
(2) require users within their jurisdiction to
utilize conservation measures and practices;175
(3) “control groundwater extractions by regulating, limiting or suspending extractions from
extraction facilities, the construction of new
extraction facilities, the enlarging of existing
facilities and the reactivation of abandoned
extraction facilities;”176 (4) regulate replenishment programs;177 (5) determine the amount of
groundwater space available within the
groundwater basin and allocate the available
storage space;178 and (6) “commence and prosecute actions to enjoin unreasonable uses or
methods of use of groundwater within the district or outside of the district to the extent
those uses or methods of use affect the
groundwater supply within the district.”179
The enabling legislation for some of the
groundwater management districts grants the
agency the power to control the places where
the water can be dedicated to use and provide
a legislative prioritization of appropriative
groundwater rights. Five groundwater management agencies have been granted authority to
restrict the exportation of their groundwater
supplies.180 The enabling acts for these districts
prohibit the exportation181 of water from the
district without a permit from the controlling
agency. The statutes then provide that a permit

may be issued only if the applicant demonstrates that there is surplus water available,
and the district determines that the exportation of district water will not adversely affect
the rights of groundwater users within the district.182 The district is instructed to limit or to
suspend exports whenever it determines that
such limitation is needed to protect the
groundwater basin.183
The legislation that created the Sierra
Valley Groundwater Management District and
the Mono County Tri-Valley Groundwater
Management District also sets forth priorities
of rights to the district’s groundwater. Both
overlying users and appropriators who use
water within the boundaries of the district, but
not on land overlying the basin,184 are given priority over appropriators who use the water outside the district. Because the priority is granted “irrespective of the time the export uses are
commended,”185 this provision can result in the
reordering of existing uses.186 Parties who use
water on land overlying the basin have superior rights under state groundwater law, but the
acts authorize the districts to assign equal priority to some district off-basin users, if the district finds that the off-basin use “is necessary
for the equitable distribution of the groundwater resource.”187
Most groundwater management districts

175. See id. § 119-702(d) (Sierra Valley Groundwater
Management District and Long Valley Groundwater Management
District), id. § 121-701(a) (Fox Canyon Groundwater Management
Agency), id. § 131-702(a) (Ojai Groundwater Management
Agency), id. §129-702(b) (Honey Lake Valley Groundwater
Management District).

180. The districts that possess export authority include:
the Sierra Valley Groundwater Management District, the Long
Valley Groundwater Management District, the Mono County TriValley Groundwater Management District, the Honey Lake Valley
Groundwater Management District and the Ojai Basin
Groundwater Management District.

176. Id. § 121-701(b) (Fox Canyon); id. §119-702(g) (Sierra
Valley and Long Valley Groundwater Management Agencies), id. §
129-702(c) (authorizing the Honey Lake Groundwater
Management District to limit extractions “in order to improve and
protect the quality of groundwater supplies or to respond to, and
rectify, conditions of subsidence”), id. § 137-702(g) (Surprise
Valley Groundwater Basin Act).

181. The statutes generally define export to mean
“groundwater extracted for use outside the boundaries of the district.” Id. §§ 119-307, 128-307, 129-307, 131-309.

177.

See, e.g., id. §§ 129-702(d), 119-702(h), 124-703, 131-

703.
178. See, e.g., id. §§ 124-703, 119-702(h), 137-702(h). Two
groundwater management acts, the Sierra Valley Groundwater
Basin Act and the Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency Act,
provide that “[t]he district, or other persons pursuant to an
agreement with the district, shall have the sole right to store and
recapture water in the groundwater basin.” Id. § 119-702(i); see also
id. 124-704.
179. Id. § 129-702(e); see also id. §§ 118-328(e), 121-701(c),
124-705, 131-702(b).
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182.

See id.

183.

See id. §§ 119-706, 119-707, 128-706(b), 128-707.

184. The statutes call these users “district off-basin users.”
Id. §§ 119-306, 128-306 (“District off-basin user” means a person
extracting groundwater for use on land within the district that
does not overlie the groundwater basin).
185.

Id. §§119-709.7, 128-710.

186. Because both exporters and district off-basin users
are exercising appropriative rights, under the common law system, the use which was commenced first would have absolute
priority over the later. Weber, supra note 9, at 738.
187. CAL. WATER CODE APP. §§ 119-709.7, 128-710 (West
1992 & Supp. 1993).
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b. General Act Districts
The legislature has authorized the formation of various water districts of limited statutory powers to conduct certain groundwater
management activities.193 None of the general
act districts have the authority to directly regulate or to limit groundwater extractions or to
define groundwater rights. Many of these water
188. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE APP. § 124-712 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1993) (“available supply of groundwater shall be allocated
primarily on the basis of the amount of water used by the operator as a percentage of the total amount of the water being used
within the agency”).
189. See, e.g., id. § 128-709 (“rights to the use of the available supply of groundwater shall be allocated primarily on the
basis of the number of acres overlying the basin or subbasin that
a user owns or leases in proportion to the total number of acres
overlying the basin or subbasin”).
190. In making this determination, the agencies must consider the following factors: “(a) The number of acres actually irrigated compared to the number of acres owned or leased. (b) Crop
type. (c) Wasteful or inefficient use. (d) Reasonable need. (e)
Water conservation activities. (f) Any other factors that the board
reasonably determines it should consider in order to reach an
equitable distribution within the entire district.” Id. § 128-709; see
also id. § 119-709.5.
191.

See, e.g., id. §§ 119-601 to 119-605, 119-703, and 119-

704.
192.
905.

See, e.g., id. §§ 129-801 to 129-807, and 129-901 to 129-

districts can indirectly manage groundwater
use, however, through their authority to levy
assessment fees on the production of groundwater (“pump taxes”) and to manage replenishment programs.194 General act districts also
have the authority to initiate or participate in
litigation that affects the common supply of
users within the districts and to take other
actions to protect the quality of groundwater.195
c. Area of Origin Statute
Limitations: Water Code
Section 1220
“In 1984, the Legislature enacted sweeping
‘area of origin’ protection for over a dozen
identified Northern California stream systems.”196 This legislation included section 1220
of the Water Code. Section 1220 prohibits the
pumping of groundwater “for export within the
combined Sacramento and Delta-Central
Sierra Basins . . . unless the pumping is in compliance with a groundwater management plan
that is adopted by [county] ordinance . . . .”197
Pursuant to this section, the board of supervisors of a county that includes any part of the
combined Sacramento and Delta-Central
Sierra Basin is authorized to adopt groundwater management plans “to implement the purposes of this section.”198 The legislation does
not require the county board of supervisors to
enact such management plans, however, nor
does it specify the components that such a
193. See CAL. WATER CODE § 20500 (Irrigation Districts), id. §
3000 (County Water Districts), id. § 34000 (Water Districts), id. §
39000 (Water Storage Districts), id. § 50000 (Reclamation
Districts), id. § 55000 (County Waterworks Districts), id. § 56000
(Drainage Districts), id. § 60000 (Water Replenishment Districts),
id. § 70000 (Levee Districts) id. § 71000 (Municipal Water
Districts), id. § 74000 (Water Conservation Districts).
194.

See Neese, supra note 69, at 50.

195. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 60222 (authorizing a water
replenishment district to take any action necessary to prevent
“interference with water, the quality thereof, or water rights of
persons or property within the district”), id. §§ 74641-74643
(enabling Water Conservation Districts to bring or to participate
in litigation involving the use or ownership of water rights within
the district and in actions to prevent interference with water within the district).
196. Weber, supra note 9, at 689 (citing CAL. WATER CODE §§
1215-1220).
197.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1220 (a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).

198.

Id. § 1220(b).

199.

See Weber, supra note 9, at 688.
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also have the power to define and quantify
rights to groundwater within their district in
times of shortage. When a district determines
that it is necessary to limit or suspend extraction to prevent overdraft, it has the authority to
quantify each user’s right and to apportion the
available supply. Generally, the available water
supply is divided among district users based
on either the historic amount of water used188
for the percentage of overlying land each
groundwater producer owns or leases.189 The
agency may adjust the figure, however, if it
determines that such a division will not result
in the equitable distribution of water throughout the entire district.190
Groundwater management districts also
may regulate groundwater use by requiring
well registration and extraction statements, by
determining well spacing, and by prohibiting
well interference.191 Groundwater management
districts can fund their management activities
through groundwater extraction and management charges.192
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plan should include.199
d. AB 3030 Groundwater
Management Plans
In 1992, the legislature passed the
Groundwater Management Act, commonly
referred to as AB 3030, which added sections
10750 through 10755.4 to the Water Code.200
The purpose of the legislation was to clarify the
authority of local water agencies (including
cities and counties) to manage and regulate
the use of groundwater. The law applies to all
groundwater basins in the state, except for
those that have been adjudicated.201 Adoption
of a local groundwater management plan pursuant to AB 3030 is optional. Local water agencies may not regulate groundwater under AB
3030, however, within the service area of another local agency without the agreement of the
other agency.202
The formulation and adoption of local
groundwater plans must be conducted in
accordance with the notice, comment and public hearing requirements of section 6066 of the
Government Code.203 Landowners within the
jurisdiction of the agency may file written
protests to the plan.204 If a majority of the
landowners objects to the plan, the agency
must withdraw it and may not consider the
adoption of a new or revised plan for a period
of one year.205
According to the legislature, a local
groundwater management plan may include
the following components:
(a) The control of saline water intrusion;
(b) Identification and management of
wellhead protection areas and
recharge areas;
(c) Regulation of the migration of
200. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10750-10755.4 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1993).
201. See id. § 10750.2. The local agency or watermaster with
jurisdiction over an adjudicated basin may consent, however, to
regulation under AB 3030. See id.
202. See id. § 10750.7. There is a slightly different rule with
respect to groundwater basins that are critically overdrafted as
defined by DWR. See id. § 10750.8.
203.

See id. §§ 10753.2-10753.6.
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contaminated groundwater;
(d) The administration of a well abandonment and well destruction
program;
(e) Mitigation of conditions of overdraft;
(f) Replenishment of groundwater
extracted by water producers;
(g) Monitoring of groundwater levels
and storage;
(h) Facilitating conjunctive use operations;
(i) Identification of well construction
policies;
(j) The construction and operation by
the local agency of groundwater
contamination cleanup, recharge,
storage, conservation, water recycling, and extraction projects;
(k) The development of relationships
with state and federal regulatory
agencies; and
(l) The review of land use plans and
coordination with land use planning agencies to assess activities
which create a reasonable risk of
groundwater contamination.206
AB 3030 authorizes the local agency to
adopt rules and regulations to implement the
plan.207 These rules and regulations do not constitute, however, a “binding determination of
the water rights of any person or entity.”208 The
Act also stipulates that the local agency may
not limit or suspend groundwater pumping
unless it has determined “through study and
investigation that groundwater replenishment
programs or other alternative sources of water
204.

See id. §§ 10753.5, 10753.6.

205. See id. § 10753.6(c). The Act defines “majority” as
protesting landowners who represent more than fifty percent of
the assessed value of the land within the agency that is subject
to the proposed groundwater management plan.
206.

CAL. WATER CODE § 10753.7.

207.

See id. § 10753.8(a).

208.

Id. § 10753.8(b).
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tors) that overlie, or whose actions affect, the
groundwater basin. There is little information
available on this subject.
e. City and County Groundwater
Management Powers
The California Supreme Court has held
that regulation of groundwater is within
municipal police power.216 Thus, a city or county may enact laws to manage groundwater in
an effort to promote the health, safety and welfare of its citizens.217 Local governments may
not pass laws, however, that duplicate, contradict or enter into an area of law occupied by
general state law.218 State law occupies a field
when its coverage of a subject matter clearly
indicates that the matter is exclusively within
the state’s jurisdiction.219
Over the past few decades, several counties have exercised their police power to regulate the extraction and use of groundwater.220
These ordinances prohibit the export of
groundwater without a permit. In general, the
county will only issue a permit if the applicant
demonstrates that the exportation of the water
will not injure county water users or damage
the groundwater basin.221
Recently, the Third District court of appeal,
in the case of Baldwin v. Tehama, held that state
law, while regulating aspects of groundwater,
does not preempt county regulation.222 In
Tehama, local landowners brought a facial challenge to a county ordinance claiming that state
law preempted the county’s authority to enact

209.

Id. § 10753.8(c).

218.

See id.

210.

Id. § 10753.9.

219.

See Fisher v. Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 708 (1984).

211.

See id. § 10754.

212.

See id. §§ 10754, 10754.2.

213. See id. § 10754.3. The wording of this section suggests
that the majority of “votes cast” to approve the adoption of a fee
or assessment program is a majority of the voters, not a majority
of the landowners representing more than fifty percent of the
assessed value of the land within the agency. Thus, the voting
requirement for approval of fees and assessments is different
from the majority vote required to veto the agency’s adoption of
the local groundwater management plan.
214.

Id. § 10755.2(a).

215.

See id. § 10755.2(b), (c).

216.

See In re Mass, 219 Cal. 422, 424-25 (1933).

217.

See id.; Ex Parte Elam, 6 Cal. App. 233 (1907).

220. See Imperial County, Cal., Ordinance 420 (July 18,
1972), 432 (Nov. 21, 1972); Butte County, Cal., Ordinance 1859
(Aug. 23, 1977); Glenn County, Cal., Ordinance 672 (Sept. 6, 1977);
Modoc County, Cal., Ordinance 255 (Mar. 6, 1978); Sacramento
County, Cal., Ordinance 410, § 2 (1980); Inyo County, Cal.,
Referendum Measure A (passed Nov. 4, 1980); Nevada County,
Cal., Ordinance 1365 (Jan. 27, 1986); 1370 (Mar. 24, 1986); Tehama
County, Cal., Ordinance 1552 (Feb. 4, 1992), 1553 (Feb. 18, 1992).
221. For a survey of the county ordinances, see Weber,
supra note 9; see also Gregory S. Weber, Forging a More Coherent
Groundwater Policy in California: State and Federal Constitutional Law
Challenges to Local Groundwater Export Restrictions, 34 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 273 (1994) (discussing local government’s constitutional
authority to restrict groundwater exports).
222.

31 Cal. App. 4th 166, 171 (1994).

223.

See id. at 172.
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supply have proved insufficient or infeasible to
lessen the demand for groundwater.”209 Finally,
in adopting rules and regulations to implement the plan, the local agency must consider
the potential impact of its actions on business
and agriculture and, “to the extent practicable
and consistent with the protection of the
groundwater resources, minimize any adverse
impacts on those business activities.”210
The Act grants local agencies the power to
take all actions necessary to replenish groundwater and to manage the aquifer to achieve
sustainable yield.211 This authority includes the
establishment and collection of fees and
assessments to pay for these programs and to
regulate the extraction and use of groundwater.212 Before it may adopt a fee or assessment
program, however, the agency must conduct
an election. A majority vote of the “votes cast”
is required for approval of fees or assessments.213
Finally, the legislature stated its intent “to
encourage local agencies, within the same
groundwater basin, . . . to adopt and implement a coordinated groundwater management
plan.”214 To accomplish this, the Act authorizes
local agencies to enter into joint powers
agreements or other agreements with public
entities and private parties.215
One of the difficulties in implementing AB
3030, of course, is coordination among local
water agencies, private property owners, businesses, cities, counties and other public agencies (such as sewage treatment plant opera-
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groundwater regulation.223 The Tehama county
ordinance prohibited the “mining” of groundwater within the county and the extraction of
groundwater for export without a permit granted by the board of supervisors. A permit would
be issued only if the board found that the proposed use of groundwater would not result in
overdraft, saltwater intrusion, adverse effects
on stream flows, lowering of the water table or
mining of the groundwater basin. The ordinance
further prohibited the operation of a well in a
manner that would result in the radiance of
influence of the well transgressing the property
lines of the parcel on which the well was located.224
The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s
decision that the county ordinance was preempted by state law.225 The court concluded
that, because there was no comprehensive
state-wide regulatory scheme for managing
groundwater rights, the county could regulate
groundwater uses. Although the Court did not
rule on the constitutionality of the various prohibitions of the ordinance, it did indicate that
an ordinance that barred present use of water
simply to protect a future use within the area of
origin might conflict with the dictates of Article
X, Section 2.226
The Tehama decision allows cities and counties more aggressively to manage their groundwater resources. Direct regulation of groundwater can avoid the need for lengthy and costly
adjudications. Moreover, direct regulation
requires no special election, but simply the passage of an ordinance. These types of ordinances
are not generally subject to the veto provisions
that limit AB 3030 water plans.

Volume 6, Numbers 2 & 3

IV. Legal Uncertainties Inherent in the
Current Regime for Regulating
Groundwater
Conjunctive use of surface and groundwater, as well as the concomitant movement of
water between in-basin and off-basin sites,
inevitably gives rise to a number of complex
legal questions. Prominent legal issues include:
the rights of users to interconnected surface and
groundwater; the priority of rights to storage
space within an aquifer; agency authority to
manage water imported and stored in a groundwater basin; protection of water quality; and
regulation of exported water.
A. Uncertainties Regarding Rights to
Interconnected Surface and
Groundwater
As previously noted, many groundwater
basins are hydrologically connected to surface
water systems. If such a basin is used as a storage site for a conjunctive use project, conflicts
may develop between parties who hold rights to
the surface water and those who hold rights
either to the native groundwater or the imported “project” water. For example, if the extraction
of project water during times of scarcity causes
the groundwater table to drop to the extent that
surface water percolates into the basin, parties
with rights to the surface water may claim a right
to prohibit the agency administering the conjunctive use program from exporting project
water from the basin. The resolution of such a
conflict would be highly fact specific, and the
outcome is uncertain.
B. Lack of Priorities to Storage Space
Public agencies have a right to place water
in natural groundwater basins as part of a conjunctive use project.227 There exists no statewide
system, however, for allocating storage space
within basins or for prioritizing the rights of the
various entities who participate in, or who may
be affected by, such projects. For example, it is

224.

See id. at 171-72.

225.

See id. at 182.

226.

See id.
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227. See generally City of Los Angeles v. City of San
Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199 (1975); Niles Sand & Gravel Co. v.
Alameda County Water Dist., 37 Cal. App. 3d 924 (1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
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C. Protection of the Quantity of Project
Water Stored in a Groundwater Basin
For a conjunctive use project to function,
the supplier of the imported project water
must have legal assurances that it will have a
superior right to the water it stores in the
basin. Although the courts have held that an
importer of water has an exclusive right to
228. In Los Angeles v. San Fernando, the California Supreme
Court did not address the issue of prioritization of groundwater
basin storage space, because it found that there was not “any
shortage of underground storage space in relation to the demand
therefor.” 14 Cal. 3d at 264. The legislature has provided, however, that the Sierra Valley Groundwater Management District and
the Pajaro Valley Water Agency shall have exclusive authority to
store water in the underlying groundwater. Moreover, other special acts districts are authorized to allocate the available storage
space within their groundwater basin. These agencies, therefore,
could enjoin others from storing water within their districts.
229. See Victor E. Gleason, The Legalization of Ground Water
Storage, 14 AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N, WATER RESOURCES BULL. 532
(June 1978).
230.

See Robie & Donovan, supra note 25, at 55.

recapture water attributable to its deliveries,231
the enforcement of such a right is complicated
by the fact that groundwater rights are generally not quantified under California law.
Because groundwater is a common
resource, the extraction of water from any
point overlying the basin may affect the
amount of water within the entire basin. Thus,
an importing agency must have the ability to
monitor the water levels within a basin to
ensure that no one is wrongfully taking project
water from the basin. If the imported water is
being extracted unlawfully, the drop in groundwater levels would notify the supplier that its
rights were being invaded.232 A declining
groundwater table would not inform the
agency, however, of the identity of the parties
who were invading its water rights. To identify
the party or parties, the agency would need to
monitor the amount of water that each extraction facility overlying the basin was producing.
To accomplish this, the agency would have
to have access to the pumping records for each
well that produces water from the basin.233
Currently, there is no statewide requirement
that groundwater users maintain a record of
their extractions; nor does any state agency
collect and maintain such data. Moreover,
agencies only have the authority to require
groundwater producers to maintain extraction
records if their enabling legislation specifically
provides such power.234 Therefore, the agency
would need to work with either a local agency
that had the authority to require recordkeeping
(if one existed for the basin), or the agency
would have to enter into contracts with the
overlying landowners under which the overly231. See City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14
Cal. 3d at 264; City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal. 2d
at 76-77.
232. To ascertain whether the drop in the water table was
attributable to an extraction of the natural groundwater to which
the supplier has no rights or to the extraction of imported water
to which the importer has an exclusive right, the supplier also
would need to monitor the amount of natural recharge that was
reaching the basin.
233. The most accurate way to measure the amount of
water that is being pumped from a groundwater basin is to monitor individual pumping, which requires the licensing of wells and
the installation of meters. See Thompson, supra note 5, at 698
n.84.
234.

See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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an open question whether an overlying
landowner or agency that wishes to use all of
the available storage space in an aquifer has the
right to enjoin an off-basin entity from storing
water in the basin.228 Similarly, it is unclear
whether an agency with an established conjunctive use program could prevent another entity
from storing water in the same basin when the
former intends eventually to use all of the available storage space as part of its program.
If more than one water agency uses a particular basin to store water, conflicts over the
right to extract the water stored in the basin
also may develop. For example, groundwater
recharge can cause a basin to fill and thereby
prevent natural recharge from percolating into
the basin. In such a situation, the amount of
native groundwater stored within the basin will
be diminished and the loss of that natural
recharge must be allocated. If only one agency
has water stored in the basin, and is therefore
responsible for the artificial filling of the basin,
that agency should be liable for the loss of
native groundwater supply.229 If more than one
entity stores imported water in a basin, however, the law does not adequately define how liability for the loss of natural recharge would be
allocated.230
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ing owners would agree to compile the relevant
information. Only with such information could
the water importing agency adequately supervise the amount of water taken from the basin.
D. Protection of Water Quality
The quality of water stored within a
groundwater basin will depend on the level of
contaminants present in the basin, as well as
on the quality of water that recharges the
basin. If the quality of the water imported into
the basin is of significantly lesser quality than
the native groundwater, a court would have the
authority to enjoin the importation and artificial recharge.235 Conversely, the quality of the
imported water can be diminished by its placement in an aquifer. Surface activities may
threaten water quality in the aquifer generally,
and it is uncertain whether the importing
agency would have the legal authority to control land uses that may be polluting the
aquifer.236
E. Exportation of Project Water
In Los Angeles v. Glendale and Los Angeles v. San
Fernando, the California Supreme Court upheld
Los Angeles’ rights to recapture imported
water that is stored in a groundwater basin, or
which is used on overlying land and which subsequently percolates into the aquifer. Since
that time, however, the legislature has enacted,
235. Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution
would prohibit the placement of highly contaminated water within a basin. It is uncertain, however, what level of disparity in water
quality must be present before a groundwater user could prevent
an agency from discharging poorer quality water into the basin.
Taking into consideration the statewide need to maximize developed water supplies, a court would be likely to find that some
degradation of water quality is acceptable given the benefits
obtained through the conjunctive use program. See, e.g.,
Anderson, supra note 17, at 574 (describing the SWRCB’s decision
to authorize the discharge of water of poorer quality than the
native supply in the Chino Basin based on its determination that
the value of the conjunctive use program outweighed the risk to
water quality).
236. See Linda A. Malone, The Necessary Interrelationship
Between Land Use and Preservation of Groundwater Resources, 9 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L & POL’Y 1 (1990).
237. The legislature also may have authorized local agencies to limit the export of groundwater as part of a local groundwater management plan enacted pursuant to AB 3030. See Weber,
supra note 9, at 696. Several cities and counties have also enacted export regulations pursuant to their police power.
238. It is noteworthy that the basins which are protected
by section 1220 may be particularly well-suited to serve as con-
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or authorized the enactment of, restrictions on
the exportation of groundwater from specified
basins.237 The effect of these export limits on
the operation of conjunctive use programs is
unclear. For example, no court has yet determined the effect of section 1220 of the Water
Code on an agency’s ability to pump foreign
water that it imports into a basin for subsequent use outside the basin. Section 1220
expressly prohibits the pumping of groundwater for export from within the identified basins
“unless the pumping is in compliance with a
groundwater management plan” adopted by
the county board of supervisors.238 If an agency
stores water within one of the identified
basins, this section may preclude the agency
from transporting the stored water for use outside the basin unless the export of the stored
water is in compliance with the designated
groundwater management plan. The legislature may not have intended this limitation to
apply to the export of stored foreign water,
because the water did not originate within the
protected watersheds.239 It did not expressly
exempt imported water from the coverage of
section 1220, however.240
If section 1220 does apply to the export of
stored water, it is difficult to assess its effects
on the operation of conjunctive use projects.
The statute requires groundwater exports to be
“in compliance with” an adopted groundwater
junctive use project sites because there already exists in these
areas a vast network of conveyance facilities and, thus, a conjunctive use program would not require the large expenditures to
construct adequate conveyance facilities. Moreover, these basins
have suffered extended periods of overdraft, and the storage of
project water within the basin could help to mitigate the adverse
effects of such overdraft.
239. Section 1220 is part of a larger area-of-origin statute
that the legislature enacted to ensure that the appropriation of
water from the designated area to meet the supply needs of other
regions does not deprive users within the designated areas of
water from meeting their needs. See 1984 Cal. Stat. § 1.
240. The legislature did create two exceptions to section
1220. First, the statute does not apply to exports by either the
United States Bureau of Reclamation or the California
Department of Water Resources. CAL. WATER CODE § 1215 (West
1992 & Supp. 1993). Second, “water that has seeped into the
underground from any reservoir, afterbay, or other facility of an
export project may be returned to the water supply of the export
project.” Id. § 1220. Whether the latter exemption could be construed to exempt project water that is directly discharged into a
groundwater basin governed by section 1220 for subsequent
export is an open question.
241.

Id. § 1220(a).
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V. The Feasibility of Establishing
Conjunctive Use Programs Under the
Current Law
“Legal uncertainties regarding groundwater storage rights have been raised continually
as a serious obstacle to developing a comprehensive program of groundwater storage and
242.

See Weber, supra note 9, at 696.

243. Determination of the potential effect of section 1220
groundwater management plans on the ability of agencies to
engage in conjunctive management programs within the “protected area” is further complicated by the fact that the county
board of supervisors is not permitted to “exercise the powers
authorized by this section within the boundaries of another local
agency supplying water to that area without the prior agreement
of the governing body of that other local agency.” CAL. WATER CODE
§ 1220(c) (West 1992 & Supp. 1993). Thus, if section 1220 is read
to require a county board of supervisors to enact a groundwater
management plan before a conjunctive use project could legally
be operable, any local water supply agency that delivered water
within the county would have the power to veto the creation of
the project.

management.”245 These obstacles can be overcome, however, by the creation of institutional
arrangements that address the problems analyzed above. The specific design of these
arrangements will depend on the types of
water rights, laws and water management
issues that are present in the basin chosen for
the conjunctive use project.
A. Adjudicated Basins
Creation of a conjunctive use program is
easiest in an adjudicated groundwater basin.246
In an adjudicated basin, the rights to the native
water supply are defined by a court order. The
pumping rights are quantified and a courtappointed watermaster, who manages the
basin, usually maintains complete extraction
records for each well that produces water from
the basin. The importing agency, therefore,
would not be required to monitor extractions
to ensure that its stored supply is protected.247
Moreover, as part of the adjudication itself, the
hydrological and geological characteristics of
the basin are studied and factual disputes are
resolved. Based on these data, the importing
agency could determine, to a large degree of
certainty, the basin’s physical capacity to
receive and retain project water without having
to invest in extensive scientific studies. The
data also would help to avoid factual disputes
if conflicts over the basin’s water supply develop at a later date. In such a basin, the outcomes of future disputes would be most predictable, and the importing agency would have
relative certainty in its continued right to the
use of the stored water supply.
In addition, the legislature has prohibited
local agencies from adopting AB 3030 ground244. For a survey of the substantive provisions of various
county export ordinances, see Weber, supra note 9, at 698-735.
245.

Robie & Donovan, supra note 25, at 51.

246. Indeed, some observers have considered adjudication to be an essential prerequisite to groundwater banking. See,
e.g., James H. Krieger & Harvey O. Banks, Ground Water Basin
Management, 50 CAL. L. REV. 56, 61 (1962).
247. The importing agency’s assurance that individual
overlying landowners will not invade its rights to stored water is
somewhat diminished by the fact that the court does not have
authority to determine such users’ unexercised rights. See Wright
v. Goleta Water Dist., 174 Cal. App. 3d 74 (1985).
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management plan.241 This could be interpreted
as prohibiting all pumping for export until a
county enacts a groundwater management
plan with which the export pumping would
need to comply. Alternatively, the section can
be read as only prohibiting exports that contravene an enacted groundwater management
plan; and, if no such plan exists, there are no
restrictions on groundwater exports.242 Under
the former interpretation, a county could prevent its groundwater basins from being used as
part of a conjunctive use project simply by not
acting. Under the latter construction, a county
would have to enact a groundwater management plan to prevent an agency from utilizing
available storage space in its basin.243
Similar questions arise in those basins
that are governed by local groundwater management plans adopted under AB 3030, or pursuant to city or county ordinance. Generally,
these plans prohibit the export of groundwater
without a permit and provide that a permit will
only be granted if the governing agency determines that the exports will not adversely affect
in-basin users.244 It is unclear whether local
governments have the authority under AB
3030, or pursuant to their police powers, to
limit an importing agency’s property rights to
water stored within a basin .
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water management plans for basins that are
subject to court orders, judgments or
decrees.248 Therefore, a conjunctive use program maintained in an adjudicated basin
would not run the risk of being subjected to
multiple, potentially conflicting groundwater
management plans.
B. Special Act Districts
Special groundwater management districts
possess a variety of management powers that
would assist the creation of conjunctive use
projects. First, special districts are authorized
to store and recapture water within the basins
under their jurisdiction. Second, the legislature has endowed several special districts with
the power to allocate available storage space
within their basins. Thus, an importing agency
could enter into a contract with the special district to guarantee the right to use a specified
amount of storage within the aquifer and to
operate a conjunctive use project for a specific
amount of time. Third, the special district’s
power to require groundwater producers to
maintain extraction records could provide the
importing agency with assurances that no one
would interfere with its right to the stored
water. Finally, special districts are authorized
to limit extractions if they determine that such
action is necessary to protect a groundwater
basin. If the district exercises this authority, it
can quantify groundwater users’ rights and
thereby define rights to the native supply.
C. General Act Districts
Although general act districts do not possess the power to directly manage groundwater
extraction, they nonetheless can exert considerable management authority over underlying
groundwater basins. For example, districts that
supply water to their members often hold title
to the water rights or water contract rights of
their members. An importing agency could
minimize the risks inherent in implementing a
conjunctive use program by contracting with
the district to establish methods for determin248.
1993).
249.

See CAL. WATER CODE § 10753 (West 1992 & Supp.
See id. §10753.7(i).
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ing the amount of water that the district’s
members may extract from the basin. If the district violated the agreement, the importing
agency could sue to enforce the contract without the need to bring all groundwater users
into the litigation. Because many general districts also have the authority to maintain
groundwater replenishment programs, the district and the importing agency allocate
between themselves the available storage
within the basin.
D. Basins Subject to AB 3030 Management
Plans
AB 3030 expressly authorizes local agencies to include in their groundwater management plans procedures for facilitating conjunctive use operations.249 The plan also can provide for the monitoring of groundwater levels
and storage,250 management of recharge areas251
and procedures for reviewing land use activities that “create a reasonable risk of groundwater contamination.”252 Thus, local agencies that
desire to participate in conjunctive use programs could use the authority granted in AB
3030 to clarify the rules applicable to such programs.
E. Basins Subject to Multiple Agency
Control
Because the physical boundaries of
California’s groundwater basins often do not
align with the political boundaries of local
water agencies and municipalities, there may
be a multitude of public entities that possess
some management authority over a single
groundwater basin. The interplay of the various
entities’ management plans and authorities
can greatly complicate the process of establishing a conjunctive use program, as well as
increase the transaction costs of implementing
such a program.
F. Basins with Export Restrictions
As discussed previously, an importing
agency that wants to store water in a basin that
250.

See id. § 10753.7(g).

251.

See id. § 10753.7(b).

252.

Id. § 10753.5(l).
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VI. Suggestions for Legal Reform
As the legislature has recognized, the
design, implementation and maintenance of
conjunctive use projects will require substantial investments. Water agencies and water
users will participate in such programs only if
there exist adequate legal assurances that they
will benefit from participation and that their
property rights will not be impaired.253 Under
the current legal regime for regulating
California’s water resources, however, there are
significant impediments to the creation of conjunctive use projects. While parties can overcome many of these impediments by contracting with agencies endowed with some groundwater management authority, the legal uncertainties unnecessarily increase the cost of
implementing such programs and may discourage the creation of innovative techniques
for managing water resources.254
To address these problems, the legislature
should amend the Water Code to eliminate the
unnecessary risks associated with participation
in conjunctive use programs and assign the
risks that cannot be eliminated. This new legislation should include express authorization for
local entities with groundwater management
authority to engage in conjunctive use programs, and clarification of the ambit of the various agencies’ control over the water stored
and used in such programs. Rights to water
253.

See, e.g., id. § 1011.5.

254. See, e.g., Zachary Smith, Rewriting California Groundwater
Law: Past Attempts and Prerequisites to Reform, 20 CAL. W. L. REV. 223
(1984).
255. There have been many calls for the creation of a centralized state agency to manage California’s groundwater
resources. These proposals have been met with strong opposition. For a discussion of the various legislative attempts to
increase state control over groundwater, see Kletzing, supra note

stored in a groundwater basin pursuant to a
conjunctive use project are most secure where
a local water management agency has the
authority to define rights to the native supply,
define and prioritize rights to available storage
space, protect recharge areas and monitor
extractions.
Delegation of this authority to local agencies is preferable to creation of a state groundwater management law or agency. Because
California encompasses a large and hydrologically diverse area, the distinct problems of the
different areas require specialized attention.
Moreover, it is unlikely that the legislature
would enact broad-scale legislation that alters
the way in which the state’s groundwater
resources are managed.255
A. Amend AB 3030
AB 3030 has provided local water agencies
with many of the tools needed to create and to
administer conjunctive use programs. The legislature could encourage the development of
conjunctive use projects by strengthening this
law in three ways. First, it should amend Water
Code section 107540.4 to require local agencies with regulatory control over groundwater
basins to adopt groundwater management
plans.256 By directing local agencies to develop
groundwater management plans, the legislature would encourage the agencies to develop
a better understanding of the hydrology of the
basin, water rights, water quality, supply and
demand, and other information that is essential to conjunctive water management.
Second, AB 3030 should also be amended
to clarify the extent of local agencies’ legal
authority to enter into conjunctive management agreements. Section 10753.7 of the Water
Code provides that an agency may include in
its groundwater management plan compo26, at 1254-57; Robie & Donovan, supra note 25, at 51; and Krieger
& Banks, supra note 246, at 67-68. See also CAL. ASSEMBLY INTERIM
COMM. ON WATER, GROUNDWATER PROBLEMS IN CALIFORNIA 47-48
(Assembly Comm. Reps., Vol 26, No. 4, 1962); GOVERNOR’S COMM.
TO REVIEW CAL. WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT 168 (1978).
256. Section 10750.4 currently provides: “Nothing in this
part requires a local agency overlying a groundwater basin to
adopt or implement a groundwater management plan or groundwater management program pursuant to this part.” CAL. WATER
CODE § 10750.4 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
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is subject to export restrictions risks losing the
right to extract water for use outside the basin.
Because the law does not clearly address the
rights of importing agencies subsequent to
exporting project water, this risk may prevent
the implementation of a conjunctive use program in any basin subject to export restrictions.
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nents designed to facilitate “conjunctive use
operations.”257 This section does not define the
type of actions an agency may take to carry out
such a program, however. For example, it is
unclear whether a local agency may establish
priorities to the use of available storage space
in the basin.258 It is also unclear whether local
agencies may compel their members to participate in a conjunctive use program. The legislature should amend AB 3030 expressly to provide for this authority.
Third, to ensure that local agencies consider and evaluate competing views and needs
when designing their management plans, the
legislature should provide specific criteria that
an agency must consider when establishing
rules and regulations to carry out the local
groundwater management plans and conjunctive use programs. These criteria should
require the local agency to consider not simply
the needs of its users and region, but also the
demand for water in other parts of the state
that might benefit from conjunctive management of the groundwater basin over which the
agency has jurisdiction. The Water Code currently requires the agency only to consider the
effects of its AB 3030 plan “on business activities, including agricultural operations, and to
the extent practicable and consistent with the
protection of the groundwater resources, minimize adverse impacts on those business activities.”259 By directing local agencies to take into
account broader state interests when designing and implementing groundwater management plans, the legislature could help prevent
the “Balkanization” of California’s water
resources policy.
B. Enact Water Export Legislation
The existence of local groundwater plans
or ordinances that prevent, or severely limit,
the export of groundwater from specified
basins may cripple efforts to create conjunctive use programs. The legislature should clar257.

Id. § 10753.7.

258. Section 10753.8 does state that “[n]othing in this part
shall be construed as authorizing the local agency to make a
binding determination of the water rights of any person or entity.” Id. § 10753.8(b). This does not preclude the agency from
establishing priorities to the use of storage space, however.
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ify the authority of local agencies to enact and
enforce anti-export ordinances. These ordinances should not necessarily be prohibited.
Although anti-export laws may frustrate the
development of conjunctive use projects, they
also provide certainty to the supplier of
imported water. Where an anti-export ordinance is in place, an agency that imports and
stores water in the basin will have assurances
that no third parties will extract the stored
water for export outside the basin. The legislature should declare that local groundwater
laws which prohibit or restrict the export of
native groundwater may not be applied to
imported water stored in the basin for subsequent use or export. The legislation also
should provide that the importing agency and
other parties to the conjunctive use agreement shall retain the rights to use or to export
the project water. Finally, the legislature
should provide that local agencies may not
prevent the implementation of a conjunctive
use program simply by failing to enact a local
groundwater plan or other groundwater management ordinance.
VII. Conclusion
To ensure that California is able to meet
its water needs in the twenty-first century, new
ways of managing available resources must be
created. One of the most promising techniques for stretching developed water
resources is the establishment of conjunctive
use programs. Although there remain a variety
of institutional constraints imposed by
California’s multi-layered and complex system
of allocating its water resources that make it
difficult to establish such programs, it is possible under current law for water agencies to
design and to implement broad-scale conjunctive use programs by clarifying the participants’ rights and liabilities in contractual
agreements.
259.

Id. § 10753.9.
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To facilitate these arrangements, the
California legislature should modify the
statutes that govern groundwater and local
water agencies to help accomplish more efficient conjunctive management of the state’s
water resources. By clarifying the authority of
local agencies to design, maintain and enforce
conjunctive use agreements, the legislature
should remove barriers that presently create
disincentives for participation in such programs.
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